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The problem of convoy defense against a mixed threat of conventional 
and nuclear submarines is posed. A general, conceptual method of solution 
is offered from which a simple analytical model is constructed. Use of 
the model for obtaining "optimal policies" of screening force disposition 
is demonstrated. Underlying assumptions of the model and related 







This thesis is intended to be read by both the operations analyst 
and the line officer. It also needs the critique of both. Chapters III 
and IV are primarily for the operations analyst, but the line officer 
should also read at least the summaries in Chapter III and the general 
formulation in Chapter IV. On the other hand, much of the analysis 
in Chapter V must be judged by the line officer, but is important to 
the operations analyst because it is vital to the analytical model. 
A sample convoy screening problem was sent to Destroyer Squadron 
Commanders last fall when the study was begun. We wish to acknowledge 
a major debt to those Squadron Commanders listed in Appendix D who 
were kind enough to send solutions, and in many cases, offer further 
suggestions. Special appreciation is due to the other commands which 
made replies even though they were not requested. The ideas expressed 
permeate the entire thesis. Occasionally in the thesis, too, we have 
tried to correct what we regard as misconceptions, without reference 
to specific replies. 
M0l3 t1y, however, we must thank our adviser,Professor W. P. 
Cunningham, whose counsel and encouragement have been so valuable during 
the past six months. 
The thesis is CONFIDENTIAL because (1) reference is made in 
Chapter V to material in classified studies, and (2) the tactical con-
cepts in Chapters V and VI, when taken together, would provide an 
unauthorized reader with insight into some aspects of current U. S. Naval 
tactics and thought. However, Chapters I through IV, and Appendices A, 
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TABLE OF DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
Torpedo Danger Zone (TDZ) - The region around the convoy within which a 
sumbarine firing a torpedo has a positive probability of attaining 
a hit against the convoy. 
Danger Zone - The area bounded by the detection circle, the torpedo 
danger zone, and the limiting lines of approach. 
Detection Circle (Rd) - The expected distance from the convo
y at which a 
submarine w11l have completed classification of the convoy and 
commenced closing. 
Equi-threat Contour - The locus of points around the convoy at which a 
submarine, firing as many torpedoes as possible before neutrali-
zation, may be expected to achieve the same number of hits against 
the convoy. 
Escort - A ship or helicopter of the screening force. 
Iso-probability Contour - The locus of points around the convoy at which 
a submarine, firing a torpedo at the convoy, has the same 
probability of achieving a hit against the convoy. There are 
different sets of loci for aimed and random firings. 
Limiting Lines of Approach -
1. LLA - The lines bounding the region ahead of the convoy 
witRin which conventional submarines have positive prob-
ability of closing the convoy and attaining a hit. 
2. LLA - not uniquely defined. Loosely, the lines bounding 
the region ahead of the convoy within which conventional 
submarines represent a significant threat to the convoy. 
Neutralize - To sink, cripple, drive off, or otherwise eliminate any 
further immediate threat of a submarine to the convoy. 
Picket - An escort stationed outside the screen perimeter. 
Pouncer - An escort stationed inside the screen perimeter. 
RISK - The ratio of the expected number of hits which a submarine 
attacking the convoy will attain to the expected number of hits 
that a conventional submarine, having penetrated the screen, 
will attain. . 
Sonar Detection Range (R ) - The detection range for which the expected 
number of submar~ne targets detected at a greater distance from 




at a lesser distance. It is roughly equivalent to the "effective 
sonar range", a term not use in the thesis. One~half the sweep 
width. 
Split Bearings - The submarine tactic of attempting to pass between 
adjacent escorts at such distances as to increase its probability 
of undetected penetration of the screen. 
Submarine Class - A "homogeneous class of submarines". A group of 
. submarines for which the threat posed and the detection, 
tracking, and kill capabilities of the escorts for each is regarded 
as identical. In the thesis, two classes only are usually dis-
tinguished, conventional and nuclear. 
Sweep Width (W) - The measure of detection capability for which the 
maximum detection range of a sweep is reduced so that the expected 
number of submarine targets detected beyond the sweep width is 
equal to the expected number of submarine targets missed inside. 
the sweep width. 
@ _ (Read "circle a".) The probability that a submarine attacking the 





INTRODUCTION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The thesis develops, in Chapter III, a basic concept for study of 
convoy defense problems when the threat to the convoy consists of sub-
marines of widely different characteristics, and the defensive forces 
are composed of ships and aircraft, also of widely different character-
istics. 
Although the concept is applicable to nuclear as well as non-
nuclear war, emphasis is on the latter. We have chosen to study the 
case in which enemy strategy is to attack merchant ships. Other 
strategies, such as weakening the screen by sinking escorts, are not 
specifically considered. We assume that the threat to the convoy from 
submarines predominates to the extent that the threat from other forces 
may be considered subordinately. 
In Chapter IV the basic concept is applied to design an analytical 
model by which to study the disposition of a screen to best defend a 
convoy from a mixed threat of nuclear and conventionally powered enemy 
submarines. We attempt to choose and weigh appropriately the key 
parameters to arrive at an optimum allocation of forces inside and out-
side the effective limiting lines of approach, and at an approximate 
range from the convoy at which to set up the defenses in the two regions. 
The effectiveness of the screen in reducing the threat is also determined. 
The model was used for calculations on a CDC 1604 computer and the 
results were analysed for various parameter changes. Examples are in-
cluded to illustrate optimal tactical deployment of escorts under 
typical conditions. 
In Chapter V ancillary problems that were studied in support of 
the analytical model are discussed. 
The precept that guided us as we proceeded through the complexities 
of the problem to obtain some simple but useful results was this: 
certain key evaluations will greatly affect, or ought to affect, the 
escort commander's tactical decisions in deploying his escorts. The 
gross effects of his evaluations upon his decisions are amenable to 




precision is an illusion, but the quantities serve as a point of 
departure a solid datum from which to combine calculations with the 
subtle information that experience and detailed intelligence provide. 
Conclusions 
1. Upon estimating the values of seven critical inputs, operationally 
useful values of the following quantities may be obtained: 
a. The percentage of escort sea.rch effort to deploy within the 
region of threat from both conventional and nuclear submarines. 
b. Within this region, the distance from the convoy at which to 
deploy the escorts. 
c. In the region of exclusively nuclear submarine threat, the 
distance from the convoy at which to deploy the escorts. 
d. The risk to the convoy under an optimal deployment. 
The critical inputs are concerned with: 
a. total escort sweep width. 
b. comparativeescort screening effectiveness inside and outside 
of the limiting lines of approach 
c. comparative threat of nuclear and conventional submarines. 
d. fraction of nuclear submarines that will attack the convoy. 
e. torpedo range. 
f. outer limits of the convoy. 
g. comparative threat of submarines penetrating the screen and 
submarines firing outside of the screen. (See Chapter IV-B) 
2. Simple, concise optimal policies for escort commanders may be formu-
lated as a function of the percentage of nuclear submarines expected to 
attack the convoy. (See Chapter IV-C) 
3. The results are sufficiently insensitive to variations in the inputs 
that are the most difficult to estimate. Consequently considerable 
error may be absorbed without significantly affecting the optimal 
policies. (See Chapter IV=C) 
4. Although some danger from conventional submarines exists as far aft 





submerged approach having once detected the convoy, the region of 
significant conventional submarine threat may be defined by arcs 
emanating from the center of the convoy, 600 on either side of convoy 
track. This region may be regarded as independent of the ratio of 
convoy speed of advance to submarine speed for at least as long as 
convoy speed is as great as submarine speed. (See Chapter V-B) 
5. There are important new weaknesses connected with using the sweep 
width concept as a basis for calculating screening effectiveness and 
stationing escorts. The "modified definite range law!! affords a 
simple means of assessing operational detection probabilities that 
largely eliminates these weaknesses, (See Chapter V=D) 
6. Because of the effect on the proper disposition of escorts for 
convoy defense~ it is important to obtain additional experimental data 
comparing the effectiveness of sonars relative to various bearings of 
submarine approach on a convoy. (See Chapter V~E) 
7. As a first approximation~ escorts should be stationed a distance 
from the convoy at which the expected number of hits by a submarine 
firing from outside the screen is equal to the expected number of hits 
by a submarine attempting to penetrate the screen. Around the screen 
perimeter~ adjustments inward and outward from that distance must be 
made to reflect submarine preference at the bearing concerned. (See 
Chapter V-F) 
8. Because many aspects of convoy defense cannot be studied adequately 
either analytically or by exercises at sea, a necessary adjunct to 
investigations of convoy defense problems is war gaming, including 
computer war gaming. The concept developed in Chapter III may be 






DISCUSSION OF THE PROBLEM 
An important problem in ASW Warfare today is determining the 
optimal defense of a convoy or other screened force against a submarine 
threat consisting partly of conventional submarines and partly of nuclear 
submarines. Clearly, in the defense against conventional submarines, 
the traditional bent line screen concept remains valid, defenses being 
concentrated within the limiting lines of approach. Clearly, in the 
defense against only nuclear submarines, escorts must defend the flanks 
and rear as well as the van, and preliminary studies of this problem 
exist*. But the problem which is the most challenging and which remains 
unanswered is how to best defend against a mixed threat of both types. 
A simple decision to defend all bearings equally is unsatisfactory. 
Weakening the van and spreading the defenses around all bearings for 
one or two nuclear submarines when there is a large number of conven-
tional submarines threatening would be unsound. But what proportion of 
the threat should be at the flanks and rear before the defenses are 
changed? If experience has shown that, once it gets into the convoy, 
a nuclear submarine can be expected to sink twice as many merchant 
ships as will a conventional submarine, how, precisely, does this affect 
the problem? If the nuclear submarine is twice as likely to consummate 
a successful attack even if detected, how should the screen be modified? 
These and many more factors bear on the problem. 
In the past, differences in detection ranges of the various types 
of escorts' sonars have been incremental, at least relative to the 
differences between sonar types today. The classical bent line screen 
tables assumed equivalent performance among all escort sonars, and 
spaced escorts on this assumption. Today wide differences between 
sonar detection ranges preclude such action. In this thesis part of 
the problem is to show how these differences may be accommodated in a 
simple fashion, and perhaps point the way for further study and analysis. 
Obviously, variations in sonar characteristics greatly affect any plan 




of escort deployment, which is the central problem of the thesis. 
Longer range submarine torpedoes with greater accuracy add another 
dimension to the problem. It is optimistic to expect to have an 
escorting force large enough to protect the convoy at ranges which 
keep the submarine from firing from outside the screen without some 
probability of success. As submarine weapon ranges and accuracies be-
come greater, the problem of stationing escorts at the proper distance 
from the convoy becomes more critical, and is an important element of 
the thesis. 
At present, VS aircraft greatly assist in neutralizing a conven-
tional submarine threat but are of lesser value against penetrating 
nuclear submarines. In general, aircraft effectivness against different 
submarine types may be expected to continue to differ widely. If VS 
aircraft are present and deployed optimallY1 how is their contribution 
to be accounted for by the escort commander? He can afford neither to 
ignore their presence nor exaggerate their role in convoy defense. 
The escort commander may have very little intelligence on which to 
base his decision. Considering the probably heterogeneous nature of 
the ships in his force in wartime, he may even have very little infor-
mations about his own escorts -- who has the best sonar operators, 
whose sonar is likely to break down or operate at 50% effectiveness, 
who has a "hot" ECM team, and so forth. The thesis provides a frame-
work on which to base a minimum-data solution. As more information 
devolves, incremental modifications can be built on the basic framework. 
At the same time, all information at hand can be weighed and fed into 
the decision process, either explicitly in a mathematical solution, or 
by modifications based on good judgment and experience. 
Fundamental to the development of the thesis has been the authors' 
concept that a solution to a cOmplicated tactical problem such as 
modern convoy defense must leave full power' of decision with the tactical 
commander. Assumptions must be fully understood and procedures modified 
when the assumptions fail. The bent-line screen involves assumptions 
(for example, equivalent sonar performance, a specific effective 




preciated. The procedure herein assists the tactical commander in 
reaching his decision, but requires him ultimately to make his own 
deployment. There is no alternative~ 
(1) Because of the complexity of the problem and the complexity of 
the possible situations, assumptions are frequently of fundamental 
importance and must hold. If, for example, the enemy's strategy is to 
sink escorts first, the situation is changed fundamentally. 
(2) Tactical factors that are suppressed in a standard solution 
may become overriding, and the solution modified accordingly. If the 
opposing submariners prove to be exceSSively cautious, tending to fire 
from outside the screen, the protective belt should be moved out. If 
they demonstrate aggressiveness and consistently attempt penetration, 
the screen may be safely drawn in -- the belt tightened. 
(3) Strategic considerations will affect a decision. If the 
escorts' primary mission is to destroy submarines rather than defend 
the convoy, the deployment must be reconsidered in that light. 
To be useful in operational, tactical situations, any decision 
rule must be mathematically simple, and be independent of special ship~ 
board equipment (we have computers particularly in mind). Therefore, 
precision must be sacrificed. But this sacrifice is easily justified 
on the grounds that computational procedures yield results no b~tter 
than the worst of the input data, and input data is generally going 
to be very rough indeed. 
Our objective then, is to provide a rapid, rough, analytical 
procedure which uses as inputs, imprecise data (for some inputs, no 
data) to give the escort commander a useful means to deploy his hetero-
geneous force of escorts against a mixed submarine threat, in a manner 
more effective than now exists. The escort commander is confided with 
wide flexibility and full power to modify assignments to fit the 
circumstances. 
Evolving the procedure has entailed: 
(1) A careful review of assumptions, including an attempt 
to uncover all implicit assumptions. 




complete as possible, to provide a sound point of 
departure for simplification. 
(3) Development of a relatively simple analytical method, 
with carefully considered and justified simplifications 
and approximations. 
In judging the usefulness of the procedure developed in the thesis, 
it is important to retain in mind the concept of model building, along 
with the purpose and limitations of mathematical models. Although the 
model concept is thoroughly appreciated by operations analysts, it is 
not so well understood in the operating forces. A model is an attempt 
to simulate actual conditions (i,e., the natural environment) to the 
degree that it will yield predictions accurate enough to make application 
of the model worth-while. The more complex the actual situation, the 
more necessary it becomes to reduce the problem to what is viewed by the 
analyst as its essence, and the less accurate the prediction. The 
analyst's aspiration is to produce a method which will generate useful 
predictions. It is entirely possible that the prediction is valueless, 
not because of faulty mathematics or faulty logic, but because of a 
faulty conception of the problem's essentials: Usually the analyst 
can make a pretty shrewd estimate as to the model's effectiveness, 
that is to say, the preciSion of prediction (and the fact that the 
model's precision is low does not mean that its value may not still be 
high). But the interactions of nature are so complicated, and philosoph-
iscally speaking, our perceptions of nature so artificial, that the 
accuracy of even relatively simple models must almost always be confirmed 
experimentally. 
Finally, to those who are skeptical of the scientific study of war 
on the grounds that war is 5% science and 95% courage, sweat, and 
endurance, we say this: the margin of superiority which gives victory 
may be small indeed. We cannot afford to neglect the last 5% that 





CONCEPT OF THE SOLUTION 
In this chapter we present the fundamental characterization of the 
problem. First we review our basic assumptions. Second~ we present 
in broad terms our concept of the solution. 
A. Basic Assumptions 
1. Escorts will be deployed to optimize ASW defense. We do not 
treat the effect of the air, missi1e~ and surface threat on the problem. 
2. We are analyzing convoy defense in non=nuclear war, although 
'there is a carry-over to a nuclear war situation in which convoys are 
employed. 
3. By leaving escort commanders wide latitude in the final assign-
ment of ships and helicopters to screen stations~ we assume that detection 
by an escort amounts to neutralization of the contact, or equivalently, 
that neutralization is directly proportional to detection. 
4. Similarly, we do not consider the contribution of other sensors, 
radar, electronic countermeasures, etc. v but leave the escort commander 
the problem (and the flexibility) to integrate their contribution. 
S. Escorts are deployed for optimal detection, which is, roughly 
speaking, the greatest number of detections of the most dangerous sub-
marines. We make no effort to measure the number of submarine sinkings, 
or the deterring effect of aggressive prosecution of contacts. Since 
these factors are closely linked to the detection rate, the distinction 
seems unimportant. 
6. The attack of each submarine is treated as an independent event. 
We do not consider what the effect on defensive deployment might be of 
submarines concentrating tactically and conducting coordinated attacks. 
7. The mission of the submarines is assumed to be convoy destruc-
tion. We attempt to maximize the defense of the convoy and never 
consider explicitly the security of the escorts. Again~ however 9 the 




8. We use IIhits on convoy shipping!! as a measure of submarine 
threat to the convoy in preference to sinkings because (1) hits seem 
to be a better measure of effectiveness and (2) the probability of a 
hit is easier to determine than the probability of a sinking. We 
assume that no gross error results from treating the hit on one ship 
in the convoy as equivalent to a hit on another. In particular~ we 
resist examining the intriguing problem of where best to put a CVS that 
is operating from within the screen. (But see Chapter VI-B for further 
comments) • 
9. We assume that an SSNK is not available to the defense. 
B. Concept of the Solution 
In outline, we first represent the threat to a convoy of a homo= 
geneous class of submarines*. Second ~ the defensive capabilities of 
the escorting forces is determined for the class of subnmrines. Third, 
a deployment of forces to reduce the gross threat as much as possible 
is determined. Finally, the composite threat posed by all classes of 
submarines present, the capabilities of the escorts to reduce the 
composite threat, and the optimal deployment !£ minimize ~ composite 
threat is determined. 
1. Characterizing the Gross Threat Represented by a Class of 
Enemy Submarines 
SUMMARY: A given submarine which successfully reaches a 
convoy can expect to hit, on the average, a certain number of 
merchant ships before it is driven off or breaks off its attack. 
After the submarine completes its approach to the convoy~ the 
submarine will not, in general, be equally likely to attack from 
any direction. Therefore it is important to consider the 
probability of its attack from each bearing. The probability 
that it will attack from a certain bearing times the number of 
hits it will achieve is our measure of the gross threat from 
that bearing. 
(a) The gross threat represented by submarines of a homo= 
geneous class is defined to be the number of hits E on convoy shipping 
a submarine will achieve if it reaches a convoy in the aQsence of a 
screen. See basic assumption 8 above. 
* By a homogeneous class we mean a group of submarines for which the threat 
posed and the detection, tracking, and kill capabilities of the escorts 
for each submarine are essentially the same. 
9 UNCLASSIFIED 
UNCLASSIFIED 
(b) Submarines detecting the convoy ~t their detection range 
will do so with some probability distribution sl(@) for each bearing 
9. 
(c) Part of the submarines detecting the convoy will be able 
to close successfully to the vicinity of the screen perimeter. Suc-
cessful submarines will be distributed with some prob~bility s2(9). 
Involved in the distribution is their ~bi1ity to intercept the convoy 
from the point of detection, the probable closing paths~ and attrition 
due to any cause: VS aircraft, picket ships~ etc. 
(d) There may be another, separate probability distribution 
s3(9), for the bearing of attack for submarines re~ching the convoy 
vicinity. If we assume submarines essentially cann«;l)t shift their 
bearing after closing, then s3(9) = s2(9). If we aSSlmt<B submarines 
have complete freedom to chose their attack bearing~ and in ~ddition, 
are able to detect the weakest point of the screen~ then the distribution 
of attacking submarines would be the one which maximized their opport= 
unity for success against the defensive dispositi«;l)n~ in which case the 
minimax solution of a game theory problem is involved. In any case~ 
we have made the important assumption ths\'t once the submarine has 
selected a bearing of attack, it is committed to closing the center of 
the convoy on an essentially constant bearing. 
(e) The gross threat E(9) from every bearing is therefore the 
probability s3(9) that a submarine of the class attacks on bearing 9 
times the expected number of hits E the submarine would achieve if it 
were to reach the convoy: E(9) = E • 8 3(@). 
2. Representing the Defensive Capabilities of the Screen 
SUMMARY: Each escort has a certain probability of detecting 
a given submarine when the submarine passes near enough to the 
escort. The probability is usually characterized by a lateral 
. range curve, which may be visualized as a ~uantity of detection 
capability spread on either side of the escort. This detection 
capability may be thought of as removing the threa't of a pro= 
portion of submarines attempting to penetrate the screen within 
detection range of the escort -- screening out a fraction of 
submarines. The screening effectiveness of an escort depends 




the sonar, location of the escort, and tactics ©f the submarine. 
The detection capability under these varying c©nditi©ns is IOUI' 
measure of effectiveness of each escort. 
(a) The measure of defense is defined as the slOnar detection 
capability of the escort screen consisting of surface ships and heli-
copters integrated into the screen. See basic assumptions 2 and 3 above. 
For each bearing 9 and range r there is an applicable lateral range 
th 
curve Yk(0;e,r) for the k escort. A lateral range curve Yk(0;e,r) 
depends on, among other things, submarine penetration depth and speed, 
water conditions, manner in which escort is patrolling, station sonar 
operator performance, and wake effect astern. 
(b) Each escort will detect submarines attempting to penetrate 
in its vicinity according to its lateral range curve. An escort sta.= 
tioned at (9k ,rk) will detect a submarine attempting to penetrate the 
screen with probability 
3. Deploying Defenses to Reduce the Danger as Much as Possible 
SUMMARY: To deploy the escorts most effectively against a 
given submarine, they should be stationed where they will achieve 
the most detections, which is a balance between where the escorts V 
screening effectiveness is greatest~ and where the submarine is 
most likely to attack. In addition, the escorts must be stationed 
far enough from the convoy to offer the submarine no advantage by 
firing from beyond detection range, but not so far as to offer it 
an advantage by penetrating a screen which has been weakened too 
greatly by stationing escorts far from the convoy. The perimeter 
around the convoy which gives the submarine no advantage of choice 
is a line of defense along which to station the escorts. The 
escorts should be stationed along the perimeter so as to achieve 
the most detections. This is equivalent to reducing the threat of 
a given submarine by the greatest amount. For any screen disposition, 
the reduction of threat is our measure of effectiveness of that 
disposition. 
(a) Ignore momentarily the danger from a submarine firing 
from outside the screen. Then for maximum detection~ escorts will be 
stationed along a perimeter at the minimum range I' (9) from the convoy 
m 




penetrator. Define threat T(Q) to be the expected number of hits a 
submarine on bearing Q will achieve when esco~ts 8re present, The 
escorts present provide some probability Y(Q) of detecting a submarine 
attempting penetration at bearing Q. Therefore T(Q) = E(@) . (l=Y(Q»). 
Threat from all bearings ~ Th~ is minimized by stationing escorts (by 
trial and error~ dynamic progranuning 9 applying the theory of optimum 
allocation of search effort*~ or any other procedure) 8t bearings such 
that the sum of the threats from every bearing 9 Th = ~T(Q) is 
minimized. Since E is defined to be independent of 9 9 for this case 
it is equivalent to say that the thre<1:H: Th is minimized when the over= 
all probability of detection P = ~3(Q) . Y(@) is maximized. 
~ 
(b) At every beSl.ring Q and r?2T'lge r 9 a s'UbmB.ri'l"1.e can att8lin an 
expected number of hits h(Q~r) em the convoy if it chooses to fire flCom 
outside the screen. The threat from such a suhm8lrine may be character-
ized as the expected number of hits times the probability w(@~r) that 
the submarine chooses to fire from outside ri8l.ther than e.ttempt penetration 
times the probability that the submarine is there~ 
The probability w is a highly subjective decision on the P8llCt of the 
submarine commanding officer that depends on such f8lctors as the 
aggressiveness or timidity of the cOIIJm8lnding (j·fficer 9 the vGilue of the 
submarine compared with the value of the mercha~t ships he me.y sink9 
the risk of the submarine being sunk for each alterr~Clative~ and the 
strength of the screen opposing. 
(c) It may be assumed that if the submarine does not fire 
from outside the screen it will attempt penet-ration with probability 
(1 - w). The threat of a submarine at (@~r) which chooses to attempt 
penetration is therefore the probability that a submarine is on bearing 
9 times the expected number of hits that the submarine will achieve if 
it reaches the convoy times the probability that it evades detection by 
the screen times the probability that the submarine attempts penetration~ 
*See [5J, or Section 3.3 of [4J UNCLASSIFIED 
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The threat Th(9,r) for any bearing and range is then~ 
Th(8,r) = T(9~r) + T'(9~r) 
(d) Conceptually, for every bearing there is a range from the 
convoy ro at which to station escorts yielding Th(€I 9 r o) -.:: Th(€I,r) 
for all r ~ r. A line connecting these ranges forms B perimeter around 
m 
the convoy on which the escorts should be stationed. The solution to 
the problem of minimizing the threat of a single class of submarines 
over all bearing 8 and ranges r';::: rm is to assign statio:"tls on this 
perimeter which will minimize the threat \Olver all bearings~ the solution 
is to assign the K escorts to stations (9k ,ro) such that 
Th =~h(9,ro) is minimized. 
fT 
4. Solution for Two or More Classes of Submarines 
SUMMARY: Submarines of sufficiently similar tactical 
characteristics are treated as being of the same class. (In 
our analytical development we distinguish only between conven-
tionBI and nuclear submarines.) The gross threat of each clBss 
and the escort detection capability against each clBss is de-
termined. The perimeter must now be found that nullifies as 
much as possible the advantage a submarine of any class may have 
by attBcking from outside or inside the screen. This should be 
done by weighting the decision in proportion to the likelihood 
that an attacking submarine is of one class or another and the 
relative threat of the class. Around the perimeter, escorts 
should next be deployed with regard for the relative threat of a 
successfully attacking submarine c.lass and the pr()portion of 
submarines of that class th~t may be expected to attack on each 
bearing. Again, for any screen disposition~ the reduction of 
threat is our measure of the effectiveness of that disposition~ 
and the disposition which reduces the threat to a minimum is the 
solution to the problem. 
(a) For each class of submarines ~ m~ the fraction @m of 
submarines that will reach the perimeter of the convoy is determined. 
For each class, the probable bearing of att~ck 8 3 (€I) is determined. . m 
Finally, for each bearing, the probab ility that an attBcking submarine 
. f th th 1 . d . d LS 0 e m c ass LS etermLne : 
@ (9) = s3 (9) • @ 
m m m 





screen lateral range curves, Y (0;Q~r)9 the expected hits from firing 
m 
from outside the screen h (Q,r), and the aggressiveness facto" 
m 
w (EI,r) are determined. 
m 
(c) For each class of submarines there may be represented a 
threat from the fraction firing outside the stcreen erG (Q~r)9 a threat m 
from the fraction attempting penetration T (9 9r)9 and a total threat m 
for the class at the bearing 9: 
The threat for all classes on bearing e is Thr(Q,r) = 'Ih (Q 9r) • @ (@) 0 m m 
(d) Again we conceive of a ltange r (9):o\'t which to statioJU 
o 
the escorts to minimize the threat alltmg be~.lting ~L El.::.'1d establish a. 
perimeter line around the convoy. The concept of the solutio:fJ. of the 
problem of minimizing the threat of 8m attacking submaltine of amy class 
is to assign stations on this perimeter that will minimize the threat 
over all bearings: assign the K escorts to stations (9k ,ro) such that 






THE ANALYTICAL MODEL 
We shall present two models. Model I is a simple first approxi-
mation which serves to introduce certain assumptions and illustrate 
the authors' method of evaluating screen disposition. It also provides 
a natural lead-in to Model II. Although some of the implications of 
Model I have a degree of validity, the conclusions in this paper are 
based upon the results of Model II. 
A. Model I 
Definitions 
1. E •••••. the average (expected) number of hits which a conventional 
c 
submarine, having penetrated the convoy screen~ will score against the 
convoy. We assume that all conventional submarines may be treated as 
one class. E presumably will vary with convoy size v speed~ disposition, 
c 
and location; however, for a given set of conditions it represents a 
fixed (possibly unknown) number. 
2. E ...... as above, for a nuclear submarine. 
n 
3. k ••••••• the ratio E I E . That is, E = k . E n c n c 
4. LU ..... the limiting lines of approach. These are app licab 1e to 
conventional submarines only and are defined by the ratio of submerged 
submarine speed to convoy speed. See Chapter V - B for a fuller 
discussion of the LU. 
5. U ••••••• the angle at the front of the convoy sub tended by the 
LLA. Typically, we consider U = 120 degrees. Again, see Chapter V-B. 
6. sector 1 ••••• the region bounded by and lying within the LLA. 
sector 2 ••••• the region lying outside the LU. 
7. Pl •••••• the probability that the screen detects a submarine 
attempting penetration in sector 1. 










8. THR1 ••• the threat from sector 1 due to submalrines alt'l!:empting 
penetration. THR = the expected number of hits suffelred per submarine 1 
attacking via sector 1. 
THR2 ••• the threat from sector 2. 
THR •••• the total threat. THR = THRl + THR2 • 
9. @ ...... the probability that an attacking submarine is nuclear. 
In general, this is not simply the ratio of the nuclear submarines in 
the area to the total submarines in the area. @ depends not only upon 
that ratio, but also upon submarine disposition~ convoy disposition and 
speed, the geography of the transit area~ and other factors. See 
Chapter V-A. 
10. RISK ••• THR / E 
c 
Assumptions 
These assumptions are in addition to the basic assumptions made 




1. PI is proportional to the amount of effective force assigned to 
sector 1: P2 is proportional to the amount of effective force assigned 
to sector 2. 
2. The attack bearing for a nue lear submarine is equally like 1y 
around the compass, 
3. PI is not a function of submarine type. That is~ a screen element 
is as like ly to detect a conventional submarine as a nuclear submarine. 
Analysis 
In this model, the quantity RISK is our measure of screen effective-
ness. For example, RISK = 1.00 says that the effectiveness of the 
screen is such that an attacking submarine will~ on the average~ in-
flict the same number of hits as would a conventional submarine which 
had successfully penetrated the screen, RISK is, among other things, a 
function of @, the probability that an attacking submarine is nuclear. 
It is to be expected that RISK increases as @ becomes larger. The rate 
of this increase depends upon the value of k, a measure of the nuclear 
submarines' superiority to the conventional submarine. RISK is reduced 
by the presence of defensive elements which either dissuade the sub-
marine from pressing the attack or kill the submarine. As discussed 
in Chapter III, for the purposes of this paper we regard the detection 
of the attacking submarine as tantamount to the successful defense against: 
that particular attack effort. Hence, RISK is directly a.ffected by 
the values of PI and P2, The purpose of this models and in greater 
detail, Model II, is to investigate the dependence of RISK upon @, 
k, PI' and P2 , 
The model 
If there were no defensive force at all, the threat, THR, would 
be given by 
THR = (probability sub is conventional) x (expected number hits 
due to conventional sub) + (probability sub is nuclear) x 





THR = (1 - @) • E +@ . E c n 
= (1 
- @) . E +@ k E c c 
= (1 - @ + @ k) . E . c 
The event of a submarine attacking can be split into the two 
mutually exclusive events that it attacks via sector 1 or that it 
attacks via sector Z. THR can also be so split. THR1, the threat in 
sector 1, is 
or 
= (1 - @) . E . (probability conventional sub 
c 
attacks in sector 1) + @ . k . E (probability 
c 
nuclear submarine attacks in sector 1) 
= (1 -@) . E 
c 
• 1 + @:.k • E 
c 
. (U/360) , 
where U is the angle in degrees subtended by the LLA, and the nuclear 
submarines have equal probability of attacking from any bearing. 
Similarly, for THRZ we have, 
THRZ = @ . k • Ec . (360 - U)/360 , 
since the probability of a conventional submarine attacking via sector 
Z is zero. 
Now if there is a defensive force, THRl and THR2 must be reduced 
by the detection probabilities which the screen elements provide. 
Hence if the force assigned to sector 1 provides an over~all prob-
ability P
l 
of detecting a submarine attempting penetration in sector 1, 
the probability that the submarine escapes detection is (1 - Pl ) , 
and THRl becomes 






is the overall probability of detecting a submarine 
attempting penetration in sector 2, THR2 becomes 
E . (360 - U)/360 . 
c 
Using the fact that THR = THRl + THR2 , and that RISK = THR/E c ' we 
have 
RISK = 1 .. P 1 + @[(l -P 1) . (Ak - 1) + 
k. (1 - A) . (1 - P 2)J 
where A = U/360. 
This is a linear function in @. Figure 2 is a plot of RISK 
versus @ for the case k = 2, and A - 1/3 (i.e., U = 120 degrees). 
The defensive force has been assumed to be of sufficient size so that 
when it is assigned in its entirety to sector 1, Pl = 1. Since sector 
2 is twice as large as sector 1 when A = 1/3, when all of the force is 
assigned to sector 2, P2 = 1/2. (This is assuming that there is no 
change in the effectiveness of the defensive element due to station 
bearing.) 
Figure 2 depicts case 1. In this case, the following relation 
holds: 
The following plot shows that for case 1, minimum RISK occurs 
when P
l 
= 1, (hence P2 = 0 from the above equation) for all values of 
@. That is, if we define optimum policy as that disposition (as a 
function of @ ) of the defense force which .minimizes RISK, then for 
case 1 the optimum policy is to always assign the entire defensive 
force to sector 1. 
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force is assigned to sector 1 and this fact is recognized by the 
nuclear submarines, hence they attack only from sector 2. (Hitherto, 
in accordance with Chapter III, we have assumed that the attacking 
submarines have no information as to the disposition of the defensive 
force.) Fig. 2 shows that even in this situation, for low values of 
@ the optimum policy is still to assign the entire defensive force to 
sector 1. 
As an example, suppose the nuclear submarine can recognize when the 
entire force is protecting sector 1, and therefore it chooses to attack 
from sector 2. Suppose, however, that it can no longer make this dis-
tinction when 3/4 of the force is in sector 1 and 1/4 is in sector 2; 
in this event, it is equally likely to attack from any bearing. Then, 
according to Fig. 2, until we believe that the probability of an 




policy is to put our entire force in sector 1. 
In Chapter V-C we discuss the effect of escorts patrolling 
stations upon their detection capabilities. It suffices for now to say 
that this effect is to increase an escortis capability, particularly when 
the escort is stationed on the beam or at the rear of the convoy. For 
simplicity, we assume there is number, which we callan effectiveness 
factor, which relates the effectiveness of escorts stationed in sector 
2 to those stationed in sector 1, when the escorts are patrolling 
stations. 
With this effectiveness factor in mind, consider the following 
examples, Cases 2 and 3. 
Case 2: The overall effectiveness of an escort in sector 2 is 
twice that of an escort in sector 1. 
Case 3: the overall effectiveness of an escort in sector 2 is 
three times that of an escort in sector 1. 
For these cases, the following relationships hold: 
Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 are plots of Cases 2 and 3 respectively. 
Fig. 's 3 and 4 illustrate the effect of variation of effectiveness 
of escorts due to bearing of station assignment. In Fig. 2, all the 
lines for different values of Pl intersected at a point for which 
@ = 1.0 In Fig. 3, however, the point of intersection has moved to 
@ = ,6; in Fig. 4, to @ = .3+ • 
The points of intersections represent the boundaries of decision 
spaces. For example, in Case 2 (Fig. 3), to achieve optimal policy 
use the following rule: 
@ ~ .6, assign the entire defensive force to sector 1. 
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Again, the dashed lines represent the RISK when all the nuclear sub-
marines attack via sector 2, given that the entire defensive force is 
stationed in sector 1. If we make the same assumptions as we did in 
Case 1 regarding the nuclear submarines' ability to discern the 
disposition of the defensive force, our rule for optimal policy becomes 
for @ ~ .22, put the entire force in sector 1. 
.22 ~ @ ~ .6, put 3/4 of the force in sector 1, 1/4 in 
sector 2. 


















As noted above, the three cases plotted were for k = 2. The 
effect of increasing k is to shift the points of intersection to the 
left and to increase (for given @ ) RISK. 
Conclusions 
This model is too elementary to warrant any conclusions as to the 
optimal policy of convoy escort disposition. It does, however, 
demonstrate the utility of RISK (THR / E ) as a measure of effectiveness 
c 
for the assignment of forces. In particular, by minimizing RISK, we 




to construct a more detailed model, retaining this attribute, but 
including the other variables which vitally affect the solution, 
B. Model II 
Discussion 
Model I was a method of evaluating RISK (THR / E ) as a function c 
of @, the probability of an attacking submarine being nuclear, given 
that the defending forces were deployed so that there was a probability 
P1 of detecting an attacking submarine in sector 1 and a probability 
P
2 
of detection in sector 2. The model did not specify how to divide 
forces (i.e., search effort) between sector 1 and sector 2, where to 
station them, or how to determine PI and P2 , Model II endeavors to 
answer these questions. 
To achieve a model which yielded manageable mathematics the authors 
were obliged to make a number of simplifying assumptions. Several of 
these assumptions we were able to justify analytically. For others, the 
justification must be that the errors introduced by the simplifications 
are not so significant as to destroy the value of the model. 
Before listing these assumptions, we introduce several definitions 
to supplement those presented in Model I. 
Definitions 
1. Ho ••••• a radius measured from the center of the convoy describing 
a circle about the convoy inside of which the defending forces will 
E£! be assigned. It is approximately the boundary of the convoy, 
perhaps several thousand yards larger. 
2. RT ••••• the range of the torpedoes employed by the attacking sub-
marines. 
3. HL ••••• HL = H + RT. It is approximately the radius of the 
o 
Torpedo Danger Zone as defined in NWP - 24A [8 J That is, it is 
the extreme limit of possible torpedo danger. 






5. Y ••••• Y = Iii = the total sweep width available in the defending 
forces. l 
6. x ..... the amount of total sweep width allocated to sector 1. 
(Y - X is then allocated to sector 2.) 
7. T ••••• T = X / Y • 100 = % of total sweep width available assigned 
to sector 1. 
8. C>( •••• detection effectiveness factor for forces patrolling station 
in sector 2 relative to sector 1. For example, if forces patrolling in 
sector 2 are twice as effective as if they were in sector 1, then 
C>( = 2. (See Chapter V-C for further discussion.) 
9. R
i 
..... the distance from the center of the convoy at which forces 
assigned to sector 1 are stationed. 
R
2 
••••• the distance at which forces in sector 2 are stationed. 
10. THR' •••• the threat (expected number of hits suffered) due to a 
submarine firing at the convoy from outside the screen. 
I 
THR1 as above, for sector 1 only. 
THR' 2 
Assumptions 
as above, for sector 2 only. 
1. The convoy is circular with radius equal to HO 
2. The LLA emanate from the center of the convoy. This is a radical 
departure from the classical concept of limiting lines of approach. 
It is justified in detail in Chapter V-B. 
3. Equi-tbreat contours for submarines firing from outside the 
screen are circular and concentric about the convoy. (See Chapter V-F.) 
4. THR v does not depend on submarine type (i.e., nuclear or conventional). 
Since the same type of torpedoes will probably be used by both types of 
submarines, and since submarine maneuverability, speed, and underwater 
capability do not enter appreciably into this type threat, this 




sec-to r L. 
5. THR' varies linearly with R, the distance of the submarine from 
the center of the convoy. Specifically, we assume the relation 
THR' = e . E (1 - R/HL), for H ~ R ~ HL 
c 0 
= 0, for R;> HL 
and is undefined for R ~ H o 
The scaling factor e is defined below. 
Thus, when the submarine is at or beyond HL, it is out of range and THR' 
is equal to zero. At the perimeter of the convoy, 
R = Ho' and 
THR' = e.E , (1 - H /HL) c 0 
= e'E (HL - H )/HL c 0 
= e'E ' RT / HL, c 





evaluation of the real threat due to a submarine firing from outside 
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occurs when the submarine is at the perimeter of the convoy. It is 
equally apparent that a submarine firing random shots from outside the 
screen, even if at the convoy perimeter, cannot be more of a threat than 
if it were loose inside the convoy. Hence the upper bound on THR' is 
) 
E , which occurs when e = HL / RT. For, a torpedo range RT = 15000 
c 
yards, a convoy radius of 10000 yards, e = HL / RT = 1.4, which is 
the upper bound on e for that particular convoy size and torpedo range. 
The lower limit of e is of course zero. 
Ob jective 
We define an optimal policy to be that allocation and disposition 
of the available defensive force which minimizes RISK (THR / E). We c 
wish our model to give us an optimal policy with respect to @ for any 
assigned force Y. That is, given a force having a total detection 
capability Y (yards of sweep width), the model should tell us what 






) to assign the remaining force (Y - X) in sector 2, 
in order to suffer the smallest expected number of hits from attacking 
submarines. 
Analysis 
Since we have assumed the definite range law as characterizing the 
sonars of the defensive forces, an escort having a sonar of sweep width 
Y. may be regarded as a barrier of length Y .• Any submarine crossing this 
L L 
barrier will be detected with probability equal to one. 
Figure 7 
Any submarine crossing 
within these limits 
will be detected 
This barrier may also be regarded in an angular sense. 
i 
escort 
Any submarine approaching point C on a constant bearing between 91 
and 9
2 




the escort is at a distance R from C, the angular width it protects 
with its linear barrier Y. is ~ 
= 2 arctan (Y. / 2R) 
1 
Now if this one escort were screening in an angular sector U 
degrees wide, and the submarines were equally likely to approach C on 
any bearing within the sector U, the probability Po of detecting a sub-~ 
marine approaching C on a constant bearing would be 
F\~uV'e. Cj 
Now let there be N defensive units stationed at a distance R from 
C in the sector U. If we allow no overlap of their search effort and 
assume the independence of each unit from the others (in a probabilistic 
sense), the overall probability P of detecting a submarine approaching 
C on a constant bearing within the sector is the sum of the prob-
abilities of each individual unit detecting the submarine. That is, 
;V N 
p ~ D -l/U • 'L!..1 
(= I {:II./ 






2 arctan (Y. / 2R) ~ Y. / R (radians) 
~ ~ 
~ ISO . Yi / IT . R (degrees) 
For Y. = 10000, R = 10000, the error is about S%. For Y. = 6000, ~ ~ 
R = 10000, the error is about 3%. (These values represent about the 
worst that might be encountered.) 
Our probability is now f/ 
P = ISO / ("IT R V) • L. Yi. 
i=I 
or 
P = lSO/(1T RV)· (total sweep width available) . 
Thus, in sector 1, if X represents the total sweep width assigned 
to that sector, Rl the distance from the center of the convoy at which 
the escorts are stationed, and U the angle subtended by the LLA, then 
PI' the probability of detecting a submarine penetrating towards the 
center of the convoy on a constant bearing in sector 1 is 
P = 1 





If X yards of defensive force are assigned to sector l~ then 
Y _ X yards are assigned to sector 2. We must multiply the latter force 
by the effectiveness factor .C>( in order to have the total effective 
screen width assigned to sector 2. We have then for P2 ' 
P 2 = 0(. (Y - X) / 21\ R2 (1 - A) = Go (Y - X) / R2 ' 
where G = 0<. / 2 7\ (l - A). 
o 
Using the expression for threat which we developed in Model I and 




THRl = ~ - @ (1 ... A)] (1 - Bo X / R1) Ec 
THR2 = @ k (1 - A) [t - Go (Y - X) / R"J E c • 
Since THR = THR1 + THR2 , we obtain 
RISK - THR I Ec ~ 1 + @(k - 1) - ~1 xl R1 + G1 (Y-X)/R~ • 
where "1 -"0 r 1 - @ (1 - A)j 
G1 = Go @ k (1 - A) • 
This is the quantity which we wish to minimize by suitable disposition 
of our available force. Mathematically, we wish to find that value of 
X which achieves mkn (RISK), with certain constraints on X, Rl , and R2• 
In order to solve this minimization problem we must first decide 
what values we should use for R1 and R2, or decide by what means we 
should determine Rl and R2• 
For reasons discussed in Chapter V-F, the authors decided to 
determine R1 and R2 by b~lancing the threat due to submarines attempting 
penetration of the screen with the threat due to submarines firing from 
outside the screen. 
In assumption 4, Model II, we presumed the expression for the 
threat due to a submarine at a distance R from the center of the convoy 
firing from outside the screen to be 




', the threat in sector 1 from submarines firing from outside 
the screen is 
THR1' = (threat from sub at Rl firing from outside screen) x 
~robability sub is conventional x probability conventional 
sub is in sector 1 + probability sub is nuclear x 





THR ' = 1 
recalling that A = U / 360. 
Similarly, for sector 2, 
THR ' = e • E • (1 -R2/HL) . @ . (1 - A) 2 c 
For the condition of balanced threats, 
Solving the above for R1 and R2, we have 
R* ~(I- ~) + [~L(I_ ~ ~~ t = 1 
where B 
I - @ ( I - A'I~ ') 
= ) I-@CI-A) 
'B'H~'X 
?7\A·e 
Not~ce that R1* and R2* are functions of X. That is~ R1*(X) is 
the distance at which X amount of force must be stationed in sector 1 
to achieve equality of THR1 and THR1' • 
Let us write R1* and R2* as 
R1 * = B 3 + j B / + B 4 • X 




and substitute in the equation for RISK. Then 
RISK = 1 +@.(k_1)_[--S-!-I-;'X========-
BJ +jBJ~f B~X 
where 
B = 1/2T\A G 
=0<'/27\(1 - A) 
0 
0 
= B 0 [1 - @ (1 - A • k] G1 = G • @ • k (1 - A) B1 0 
B3 
HL (1 - B/e) G3 





B4 = B • B . HL/e 
G4 = Go • k 0 HL/e 
0 
We are now in a position to find min (RISK). As a mathematical 
X 
problem this poses no difficulty. It can be shown that 
hence a solution of 
d 
dX 
(RISK) '? 0, for all X, 
(RISK) = 0 
is a solution which minimizes RISK. Rationalizing the denominators and 
differentiating, we have 






BI~ (G.3 '2 + G'-j y) - 5,3""' <:;:, ~ 
51?. GLj + B" G,'" 
Unfortunately, this solution is only valid for our problem if 
1. 0 ~X~Y 
2. Rl = B3 + jB/ + B4 o X ~H 0 
R2 = G3 + ~G32 + G4 o (Y - X) ~ H 0 3. 
0 ::!f Pl = B • X I Rl 6 1 0 4. 
0 ~ P2 = G • (Y - X) I R ~ 1 0 2 5. 
Because of these constraints, the authors found it expeditious to 
determine solutions by use of a computer. The program, written in 
FORTRAN 60 for the CDC 1604 computer, is included in Appendix C along 
withOa sample output statement. The notation in the program conforms 
for the most part to that in this paper. 
The logic of the program is this: 
a. let X vary over a range from Y to 0 in increments of .01 Y; 
b. calculate for each value of X the corresponding R1 and R2; 
c. test Rl and R2 for being greater than or equal to Hoo Set 
Rl (R2) equal to Ho if test fails; 





for being between zero and one, discarding all 
results for that particular X if the test fails; 
f. calculate the corresponding value of RISK; 
g. select that value of RISK which is minimum along with the 




The program was run many times over wide ranges of values for c::::.<) 
k, e, Y, and H. The calculus solution was verified for those cases o 
where it is applicable, i.e., where the five constraints are satisfied. 
Results of the runs, their usefulness, and the conclusions which may be 
drawn are discussed in the next section of this chapter. 
Results 
To investigate the results of Model II it is best to consider an 
example. Suppose we have five escorts comprising the defensive force 
for the convoy. Let each escort be equipped wi,th a sonar which may be 
characterized as having a be1ow-the-1ayer definite range of 2500 yards. 
Table 1 below summarizes the situation. 
0< Y, total sweep 
width (yards) 
Z 25000 






A = U/360 
1/3 
Recall that A = 1/3 corresponds to U = 120 degrees, where U is 
the angle subtending the LLA. (See Chapter V~B). 0(" has been chosen 
as 2 in this example and in all ensuing examples. This means that escorts 
patrolling in sector 2 are twice as effective as escorts patrolling in 
sector 1. We have given no increase in effectiveness for escorts 
patrolling station in sector 1 as compared with escorts maintaining 
fixed station in sector 1. An increase in this respect is tantamount 
to an increase in Y, (Le., a larger defensive force). See Chapter V=C 
for further discussion. 
For the above example, consider the case for which e = .5. 
From the relation, 
THRt = e . E . (1 - R/HL) c , 
at R = 10000 yards, 
THRt = .5 • E • (1 - 10000/(10000 + 15000) ) c 




That is, a submarine at the perimeter of the convoy firing from outside 
the screen (limiting case) is 3/10 as effective as a conventional sub-
ma~ine loose in the convoy - it will obtain about 1/3 as many hits. 
Letting k = 2.5, (Le., a nuclear submarine being 2Jz times as 
effective as a conventional from the standpoint of scoring hits when 
within the convoy), Model II yields data presented in the table below. 
Table 2 shows the allocation of forces as a function of @, the prob-
ability that an attacking submarine is nuclear. T is the percent of 
defensive force assigned to sector 1 at distance R1 from the center of 
the convoy. The percentage (1 - T) is assigned to sector 2 ~t distance 
R2 from the center of the convoy. RISK is the measure of THR/Ec 
when this allocation and disposition have been made, and by the method 
of solution of Model II, represents the minimum attainable for the 
situation THR = THR' (balanced threat). 
Table 2 
@ T R1 R2 RISK 
.0 100 14900 .20 
.1 100 14800 .36 
.2 62 10100 10000 .44 
.3 63 10100 10000 .52 
.4 64 10100 10000 .60 
.5 65 10000 10000 .69 
.6 27 10000 10000 .74 
.7 27 10000 10000 .75 
.8 26 10000 10000 .76 
.9 26 10000 10000 .77 
1.0 26 10000 10000 .77 
T = 62 implies that X (amount of force to be assigned to sector 
1) = .62 • Y, or 15500 yards of defensive force. This corresponds to 
three escorts having the sonars stipulated. In this way we can con-
struct the following optimal policy from Table 2. For 





.2 6- @ :;'.5, put three escorts in sector 1 at 
10000 yards, two in sector 2 at 10000 yardso 
.6 :5: @ , put one escort in sector 1 at 10000 yards, 
four in sector 2 at 10000 yardso 
For the same convoy situation, but with a defensive force of nine 
escorts equipped with 2500 yard sonars (definite range against sub-
marine best depth), the Model II solution is presented in Table 3. 
Table 3 
@ T Rl R2 RISK 
.0 100 22600 .05 
.1 60 15700 10000 .18 
.2 59 15400 10000 .20 
.3 59 15200 10000 021 
.4 59 15000 10000 022 
.5 59 14800 10000 .23 
.6 59 14700 10000 .24 
.7 59 14500 10000 .25 
.8 40 10200 10000 .25 
.9 40 10000 14100 .24 
1.0 41 10000 13900 024 
An optimal policy constructed from Table 3 is~ for 
@ = 0, put all nine escorts in sector 1 at R1 = 22600 
yards. 
o ..:::. @ ~ .7 , put five escorts in sector 1 at 15700 yards ~ 
for lower values of @, moving Rl in to 14500 yards for the 
higher values of @. Put four escorts in sector 2 at 10000 
yards • 
• 8 ~ @, put four escorts in sector 1 at 10000 yards 9 put 
five in sector 2 at 14000 yards. 
The preceding examples illustrate the information Model II provides 




in the examples all the escorts were assumed to have the same type 
sonar, this is not at all essential to the model. The only input 
regarding the defensive forces which the model requires is Y~ the sum 
of the sweep widths of the individual force elements. (See Ch~pter V=C 
for discussion of sweep width determination.) It is~ of course~ 
necessary to know how Y is distributed among the force elements in 
order to make an optimal assignment of escorts to each sector in 
accordance with the policy deduced. 
Validity of Model 
For Model II to have validity (and usefulness) it must have three 
attributes: 
1. It must indeed yield a solution which provides minimum RISK. 
2. It must respond to changes of parameters (0< , e, k~ Y, HO~ RT ) 
in a manner consistent with what experience tells us would happen for 
such changes. For example, we should expect RISK to increase as k 
increases. The model should reflect this. What our experience or 
intuition does not tell us is at what rate RISK increases with k. This 
is how the model may have usefulness. 
3. With regard to allocation and disposition of the defensive force, 
(i.e., optimal policy), the model must not be overly sensitive to 
variations of certain parameters. We would expect changes of allocation 
when we have more or less defensive force, or when the convoy size 
changes significantly, or when there are no nuclear submarines present 
vice 90% present. Changing force disposition for these reasons is 
quite feasible, however, if the model tells us to shift our forces 
drastically for every change of @, or for a change of k from 1.5 to 
2.5, its value is reduced substantially. 
With respect to attribute 1, the method of solution (whether by 
calculus or by computer) guarantees minimum RISK for the condition of 
balanced threat. As an illustration, for the first convoy example 
above in which Y = 25000, Fig. 1 shows the results of plotting RISK 




the RISK for two other possible dispositions is also plotted. The 
first is for 50% of the force in sector 1~ with R1 5 R2 = 10000 yards. 
The second is for 50% of the force in sector l~ with R1 = R2 = 12000 
yards. These two lines were plotted from the Model I expression for 
RISK, 
where 
Fig.' s 10 through 13 show the response of the model to certain 
parameter changes. Each is a plot of RISK vs k for various values of 
@. In all plots, the following parameter values were assigned~ 
HO = 10000 yards 
RT = 15000 yards 
A = 1/3 
c::>( = 2. 
In Fig.'s 10 and 11, Y = 25000 and e = .5 and 1.0 respectively. In 
Fig.'s 12 and 13, Y = 45000 and e = .5 and 1.0 respectively. Thus a 
comparison of Fig.'s 10 and 12 (or 11 and 13) illustrates the effect 
of an increased defensive force, all else being constant. A comparison 
of Fig. 1 s 10 and 11 (or 12 and 13) illustrates the effect of a higher 
weighting of the threat due to submari'nes firing from outside the 
screen. All four plots show that RISK is an increasing function of 
both k and @, as was to be anticipated. 
Also, as @ increases, in order to maintain a balance of the threats 
it is necessary to move the screen farther out, thereby decreasing the 
probability of detection and increasing RISK. As indicated in the 
graphs, this effect is much more pronounced fer the larger value of 
Y. It is interesting to note that, in all cases, the rate of increase 
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As was demonstrated earlier, the model yields data which may be 
used to form an "optimal policy" with regard to the assignment of the 
defensive force. T represents the percentage of the defensive force to 
be assigned to sector 1 at a distance Rl from the center of the convoy; 
the remainder is to be assigned to sector 2 at a distance R2• Let us 
investigate the sensitivity of this optimal assignment to parameter 
changes. 
Fig.'s 14 and 15 are plots of RISK vs T for several values of @. 
The fixed parameters are again 
HO = 10000 yards 
RT = 15000 yards 
0< = 2 
A = 1/3 
e =.5 
k = 2.5 
In Fig. 14, Y = 25000 yards; in Fig. 15, Y = 45000 yards. The minima 
of the curves correspond to the optimal division of search effort, T, 
for the different values of @. It is apparent that the criticality 
of the minimum points varies considerably from case to case. That is, 
for some of the curves there is a wide band of values of T for which 
RISK is not appreciab ly greater than its minimum value. 
With this in mind, let us assume that we are willing to accept an 
increase in the minimum value of RISK (for particular @)of .05 • 
That is, if T assures us a value of RISK which is no greater than 
minimum RISK + .05, we accept that T as optimal. Table 4 shows the 
results of this allowance. The left side of the table contains the 
same information as did the table shown earlier. The right side 
shows the range of T allowable in order to maintain RISK within .05 
of its minimum value for that particular @. The spread of values for 
Rl and R2 corresponds to the choice of selections of T. For example~ 
if the left end-point of the range of T is selected, the left end~ 
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is selected, the right end-points of Rl and R2 should be chosen. For 
intermediate values of T, interpolate linearly to find the corresponding 
R1 and R2• Errors in R1 or R2 of less than 1000 yards do not 
significantly affect the value of RISKo 
Table 4 
HO = 10000 yards; RT = 15000 yards; A = 1/3; e>< = 2. 
Y = 25000 yards; e = .5; 














































k = 2.5; R1 and R2 x 1000 yards 
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10.1 .. 10.0 
10.1 .. 10.0 
10.1 .. 10.0 
The spread of allowable values of T for each @ makes the selection of 
an optimal policy easier and permits much flexibility. For examp1e~ 
Fig. 16 is a plot of the spread of allowable values of T of Table 4 
versus @. Indicated on the plot is one possible optimal policy, namely, 
for 
@ ....:::::..2, put 78-100% of the force in sec tor 1 , 
.2 ~ @ ~ .6, put 56-66% of the force in sector 1 
.6 ~ @, put 21-31% of the force in sector 1. 
Another possible optimal policy which can be formulated from the data 




@ £:. .2, put 78-89% of the force in sector 1 
.2 ~ @ ::::$ .4, put 56-72% of the force in sector 1 
.5 ...:::. @, put 26-31% of the force in sector 1. 
Table 5 below contains the allowable spread of T for the case 
k = 3.5, all other parameters remaining constant. Comparison with 
Table 4 (where k = 2.5) shows that there are optimal policies common 
to both cases. This is an illustration of the relative insensitivity 
of the model to the input value for k, with respect to the modelvs 
specification of optimal policies. 
Table 5 
HO = 10000 yards; RT = 15000 yards; A = 1/3; co<. = 2. 
Y = 25000 yards; e = .5 ; k = 3.5; Rl and R2 x 1000 yards 
minimum RISK solution allowable range for min RISK + .05 
@ T R1 R2 RISK T Rl R2 
.0 100 14.9 .20 78-100 l2.4~14.9 10.0 
.1 61 10.0 10.0 .40 56-100 10.0"14.7 10.0 
.2 63 10.0 10.0 .52 56-77 10.0 .. 11.8 10.0 
.3 65 10.0 10.0 .65 52-73 10.0-11.1 10.0 
.4 66 10.0 10.0 .78 35-72 10.0-10.7 10.0 
.5 24 10.0 10.0 .88 20-68 10.0 10.4 .. 10.0 
.6 24 10.0 10.0 .91 20 .. 38 10.0 10.5-10.0 
.7 24 10.0 10.0 .95 19-32 10.0 10.5-10.0 
.8 23 10.0 10.0 .98 19-29 10.0 10.5 w lO.0 
.9 23 10.0 10.0 1.01 19-28 10~0 10.5-10.0 
1.0 23 10.0 10.0 1.05 19-27 10.0 10.5-10.0 
Conclusions 
The model yields a minimum RISK solution for the balanced threat 
situation. 
It reacts to parameter changes in a manner which is consistent 
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It yields data which may be used to formulate optimal policies. 
These policies are sufficiently broad in nature to allow much flexibility 
in their implementation: they are not particularly sensitive to k, 
and they do not require shifts of force for small changes in @. 
In Appendix I are ten tables, similar to Tables 4 and 5, in which 
the force level ranges in increments of 5000 yards from 25000 to 
45000. For each force level shown there are two tables; one with 





A. Difference Between Submarines in the Area and Those That Can 
Intercept a Convoy 
In the concept of the solution, Chapter III-B., the distinction is 
made between the number of submarines that detect a convoy and the 
number that are able to intercept it. In the analytical model, 
Chapter IV-B., the latter number is what determines @, the probability 
that an attacking submarine is nuclear. Because of the importance of 
distinguishing between the number of either class of submarines on 
patrol in an ocean area and the number that are able to intercept the 
convoy, this section will briefly discuss the factors that bring about 
the difference, although a quantitative investigation is not within the 
scope of the thesis. 
Studies of the probable distribution of enemy submarines throughout 
distinguishable ocean regions have been made, and are available in 
classified documents. Calculations exist of· detection ranges (the 
"detection c irc1es") of passive sonars against large convoys, for 
various convoy speeds. In the following section, the manner in which 
enemy submarines will detect and attempt to close a convoy for a feasible 
detection range is studied in some detail. Our purpose there is to 
obtain a picture of the likely distribution of submarines as they reach 
the perimeter of the screen. 
If the passive detection capabilities of nuclear and conventional 
submarines are identical, and the submarines are equally likely to be 
anywhere in the ocean area under consideration, then the fraction of 
submarines that detect the c'onvoy will be the same for both classes of 
submarines. Theoretically the speed of the patrolling submarine increases 
its probability of detection (see Section 1.5, pg 7-9, of [3J) but for 
practical patrol speeds, the increase is negligible. 
Essentially all nuclear submarines are able to interc~pt the convoy. 
For reasons which are detailed in the following chapter, not all 
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conventional submarines will be able to intercept it, but only those 
within the effective limiting lines of approach (LLA). The limiting 
lines of approach are a function of the speed of the convoy, the amount 
of air cover, and the endurance of the submarine. Higher speed convoys 
result in narrower limiting lines of approach, (theoretically) but such 
convoys will also be detected at longer ranges, and the net effect is 
that a larger number of submarines will be able to detect and close the 
* higher speed convoy. Aircraft patrolling in the Danger Zone and 
preventing submarines from closing the convoy on the surface are a very 
. powerful factor in reducing the number of conventional submarines that 
will be able to intercept the convoy. The submarine battery state at 
the time of detection and submarine submerged endurance play an import
a 
ant part in the ability of the conventional submarine to close. 
Conventional submarines will be subject to greater attrition by 
patrolling aircraft or Hunter-Killer groups escorting the convoy than 
nuclear submarines, and this attrition must be taken into account in 
determining the probable fraction of each class of intercepting 
submarine. 
Finally, nuclear submarines with their superior submerged speed 
will be better able to take advantage of tactical intelligence to 
place themselves athwart the track of approaching convoys. 
The analytical model (Chapter IV) requires only an estimate of the 
probability that an attacking submarine is nuclear. It is unnecessary 
to estimate the actual numbers of conventional and nuclear submarines 
attacking. 
B. The DiStribution Of S·ubmarines Around The Convoy 
1. Conventional Submarines 
The analysis that follows of the distribution of conventional 
submarines within the limiting lines of approach is in support of two 
* The region between the detection circle and the torpedo danger zone 
(defined in Section F) within the limiting lines of approach. 
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simplifying assumptions of Model II, Chapter IV, namely that for 
purposes of dividing the search effort: 
a. The limiting lines of approach may be treated as though 
emanating from the center of the convoy. 
b. The region within which the conventional submarine threat 
should be presumed to lie is relatively insensitive to changes in the 
ratio of submarine speed to convoy speed, s/v, for v ~ s. 
The analysis pertains to the situation in which convoy speed of 
advance, v, is at least equal to the submerged speed, s, of the ap-
proaching conventional submarines and, because of fixed-wing aircraft 
present or for any other reason, submarines detecting and intercepting 
the convoy must make a submerged approach, snorkeling or not. 
Submarines with approach speed less than convoy speed are restricted 
to an approach arc ahead of the convoy delimited by e = sin- 1 s/v on 
either side of convoy base course. Submarine speed is actually a 
variable, a function of submarine battery charge at the time it commences 
to close, and its ability to snorkel. The influence of these factors 
will be studied separately later, and for the moment s is treated as a 
constant. 
As was discussed in Chapter III, a submarine represents a threat to 
the convoy from any point within torpedo range. The threat is a function 
of both bearing and range. The threat is usually represented graphically 
by drawing lines of equal probability of a hit around the convoy, called 
iso-probability curves or contours. [4] 
The threat may also be represented by drawing lines for the expected 
number of hits from a salvo of two or more torpedoes, which we have 
chosen to call "equi-threat contour lines". Equi-threat curves might 
typically be drawn for expected number of hits of 1.5, 1.0, ,5 and 
0.0, which we have designated h1.5' h1.0' h.5' and ho in Figure 17. 
They may be determined for either aimed or unaimed* shots. In the 
studies we examined, two or three "Browning· Shots" are the usual number 
assumed. 
* A torpedo fired in the direction of the convoy, but not aimed at a 




Submarines able to maintain the speed ratio s/v that are ahead of lines 
paralle 1 to two radii on bearings ± Q and tangent to the zero equi-threat 
contour line h theoretically represent a threat to the convoy. These lines 
o 
at zero threat approximately correspond to the Limiting Lines of Approach, 
defined in NWP-24A [SJ and will be designated LLAo' 
Bent line screens protecting a point target (e.g., a carrier) are 
formed along an iso-probability contour h with the wings of the screen being p 
drawn back along a line perpendicular to the limiting line of approach and 
extending from a tangent to the curve h as far aft on the flanks as the p 
line tangent to the iso-probability curve being guarded~ LLA • See Fig. lS. P 
The iso-probability curve h selected is the one which equalizes the p 
probability of a sinking or crippling number of hits by a submarine firing 
outside the screen with the probability of the submarine penetrating the 
screen ~SJ. The probability of penetration depends on the number of 




When a convoy is the target, a submarine approaching the convoy 
near the limiting lines of approach represents a significantly smaller 
threat than one approaching from ahead. A submarine tracking just in-
side the LLA cannot hope to get under the convoy or otherwise gain a o 
firing position to obtain the maximum expected number of hits in the 
convoy. Furthermore, a small distraction by the protecting force which 
causes a course or speed change in the submarine would cause the sub-
marine to fall outside the LLA. For these and other reasons that we o 
will explore, the threat to the convoy diminishes near the LLA 0 In o 
order to measure the relative threat to the convoy posed by conventional 
submarines at all bearings within the LLA ~ and in particular~ to demark o 
bearings from the convoy within which we should presume the significant 
conventional submarine threat to be confined, the following factors are 
considered: 
a. Submarine bearing relative to convoy at time of detecting and 
classifying the convoy. 
b. Other effects of air cover. 
c. Decreased effectiveness of submarines approaching near the LLA 0 o 
d. Ability of the submarine to close on the relative track it 
desires, 
e. Effect of convoy zig-zag, 
f. Effect of escort station assignments. 
a, Submarine bearing relative to convoy at time of detecting and 
classifying the convoy. 
We assume conventional submarines attempting to intercept the convoy 
are distributed uniformly over the ocean ahead of the convoy (if the 
enemy should have intelligence allowing greater concentration along the 
convoy track, the effect will be to accentuate the results below,) • 
This assumption is equivalent to assuming a uniform distribution of 
submarines along a line just outside of submarine detection range on 
the convoy, Rd , The proportion o
f submarines that will detect the convoy 
over every interval of bearings (~l' ~2) will be 
CONFIBEUfIAI1 
p 
sin (/) -2 
2 sin U/2 
where U is defined as follows: (See Figure 19). Extend the LLA lines o 
until they intersect the detection circle, Rd. Draw lines connecting 
the center of the convoy and the points of intersection. The angle 
subtended by these two lines is U. For simplicity we have assumed that 
all noise from the convoy emanates from the center of the convoy, and 
detection and classification are completed at precisely range Rd from 
the convoy. Up to a submarine patrol speed of s = .5v, the effect of 
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The density function for conventional submarines detecting the 
convoy at range Rd and able to close it within the LLA (i.e. s sub-o '. 
marines representing a threat) is then: 
cos ~~ p «(/) = --..::::...:---2 sin U/2 
= o 
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- U/2 ~ (/) ~ U/2 
elsewhere. 
'CONFIDEN'fIAD 
Plots of a few illustrative densities for different values of 
are displayed in Figure 20. 
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In general, the ratio of submarines which will detect the convoy 
near the limiting lines of approach to submarines which will detect the 
convoy dead ahead, for the above assumptions, is 
P (U/2) 
P(O) = cos U/2 
o If U/2 = 60 , only half as many submarines will detect near the LLA 
o 
as from dead ahead, and for U/2 :::> 600 the fraction rapidly approaches 
zero. 
.cONF IBEN'f I:AL 
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Now let us examine the distribution of submarines from the moment 
they start to close until they are in the vicinity of the convoy, under 
the minimum (not the most reasonable) assumption that a submarine closes 
on collision course whenever it is able. A typical case would look like 
Figure 21, for 8:6 V ~ 12 knots. 
The expected fraction of conventional submarines in 300 segments 
around the van of the convoy was found to be as follows for a typical 




Sector .6 .8 1.0 
000 - 030 
.70 .58 .51 at 10 miles 330 - 000 from convoy 
030 - 060 
.21 .33 .37 center 300 - 330 
060 + 
.09 .09 .12 300 -
Thus, the fraction of submarines that may be expected to attack from 
o 
outside of an angle of 60 from the track, measured from the center of 
the convoy, is small. Furthermore the fraction is surprisingly in-
sensitive to s/v, which theoretically determines the limiting lines of 
approach. 
At this juncture it is well to consider the extent to which a 
conventional submarine is able to choose its point of screen penetration 
within the limiting lines of approach. If there is not a strong 
connection between the submarine's approach track and its bearing of 
penetration, then the distribution of submarines after closing the convoy 
which we have depicted above is immaterial. Such a freedom of choice 
envisions the submarine choo.sing a position dead ahead ot the convoy, 
locating say a weak right flank, outflanking the screen and slipping 
back into the convoy_ The fact is, however, that at 10 miles from the 
convoy the conventional submarine is committed to a rather narrow range 
of penetration points, not more than one to three miles wide over a ten 
to fifteen mile screen front. Therefore an attacking conventional 
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Figure 21. Typical Pattern of Submarine Approach on a Convoy J Submarine 
:Closing on Collision Course Whenever Possible 
submarine is unab Ie to take advantage of tactical information it obtains 
of the screen disposition on the way in, with the possible exception 
of information concerning the location of a powerful long range sonar 
in the screen. Strategic information -- knowledge of our past screen 
stationing habits gleaned from previous attacks 
is discussed in Section F of this chapter. 
is another matter and 
Now let us make the assumption that submarines, rather than close 
on a collision course, seek to gain a position athwart the convoy track 
at Rd/5 miles, perhaps 5-10 miles ahead. Submarines near convoy track 
(0=0) have no problem getting on the track. Submarines near LLA have o 
a hopeless problem: at best they can barely intercept the convoy. 
But submarines increasingly far from the track (i.e., for increasing 
0) must weigh the advantages of a more certain interception by getting 
onto the track against the disadvantage of depleting the battery exces-
sively prior to attack, unless they are able to snorkel freely. 
In a case for which submarines very aggressively try to get ahead 
of the convoy and are able to snorkel almost at will, the flow of 
submarines would look approximately like Figure 22. 
This vigorous attempt by submarines to get in the van results, 
quite naturally, in making the fluctuation of the density of submarines 
quite insensitive to s/v: 
Tab Ie 7 
Bearing~/v 
.6 ,8 1.0 Distribution Sector 
000 - 030 
.75 ,75 ,71 
at 10 miles 
330 ~ 000 from convoy 
030 - 060 
,15 300 - 330 
,15 ,.19 center 
060 + 
.10 .10 .12 300 
b. Other effects of air cover, 
The range that a submarine with a given passive sonar will 
detect a convoy depends on convoy size and speed. If the submarine's 




<.,.:0;, Itat'i~- ;fo~~bt~' ~~~;ine 
.H.....' submerged speed to convoy 
'.0_' SOA. s/v •• 8 
'-c'---'-C;-..,., ... , •. , •. , __ ,. , 
''''~" ;,~' 




"::":'",:",:," .. :. 
,· ... r 
~;~~<,.~ .. , 
.~: . ;- ~ 
...• ~" . 
.. ,/:"".":'~/: 
,0, • 




.. .• .; .~: "~,.::;,, •• ":" . ...,....",.'Q-:'i'<,::,'.~~ 
-; .... ". 
... ':",~r'o:, 





,~~ .. "~ .....•.. ~. 
.. ~.:-
.. .;. 
. ..:: ". 
. .• " " " o~:.: ~." . 0 f~ .. " .. :, 
.' ,' .•.. ~ . 
. . . .,.. •. ~ ... ~f..~ 




/', ''',,' ..• ;" . 
't.. 
.. ":>.'" . ~., 
'\ .~.~o··'\''; __ .;_ .. ~ ... ~~::.:::.~ .. __ ?::~ . " .. . ~:..."~ -:~-::.-. .,o.:·<:o~.,_._.):~_::~o._._L..(o'~ 
. t·, 
Figure 22 •. TyP~cal P.attern of Submarine Approach on a Convoy, 
Seeks to Gain Position Ahead_of ~onvoy Whenever Possible 
. ..-.--~> "'\ .. ::):<.~ .. ~.)'" 
Submarine 
~ ~"': ... 
..,. 
.. ,.-
'- .. ' 
CONF !BEN'%' :Ei\ll 
limiting lines of approach of submarines attempting to close from long 
range is drastically reduced. For example, if Rd = 100 miles, a mean 
speed ratio s/v = .8 would be reduced in effect to s/v = .6. See 
Figure 14-4 of [7J. Data on probable passive sonar detection ranges 
for various sizes and speeds of convoys is available in Figure 20 of 
reference rr9]. The effect of long detection range coupled with air 
cover is to increase the likelihood that intercepting conventional 
submarines will be within 600 on either side of the convoy track. 
ATP-l(A) Vol. 1 [71 shows the limiting lines of approach based on 
60% battery depletion during the approach. The battery state which 
the submarine commanding officer will accept and still attack is a 
variable that must be estimated. In addition, submarine battery state 
at the time of detection is also a variable. If the submarine is forced 
to patrol at much under 90% battery charge, the effect will be another 
significant reduction in the number of submarines that will approach 
from near the LLA • 
o 
Figure 23 exhibits typical speed ratios and times required to close 
for the case in which submerged speed = convoy SOA and detection range 
Rd = 50 miles. Observe that submarines approaching from 500 or more 
off the bow have an impossible task without snorkeling even if they 
start with a full battery charge. When aircraft radar flood the zone 
between the submerged LLA and the snorkeling LLA , the reduction of 
o 0 
submarines intercepting the convoy is considerable. If s/v = 1.0, 
completely preventing submarines from snorkeling during approach will 
reduce the number reaching the convoy by about 25%. 
Even among the conventional submarines that are able to make an 
interception, air operations will have an effect. Diesel submarines 
will have had to make a 40 to 100 mile approach submerged. Coordinated 
attacks will be greatly complicated because of the limited communications 
and difficulty of conjoint effort after the long approach. 
c. Decreased threat represented by submarines approaching near 
the LLA • 
o 
Figure 24 illustrates how the threat by a conventional submarine 
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· 'igure 24.' The threat of submarines approaching a cOnvoy with their' 
. best- relatlve-m.ot'ion-ver8U~the"--cHstance-x" the . submarinemust~ approach". 
aft of the front row of the convoy~ .." 
'" , :- c, • • • ,:' ~ • 
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Each line labeled L~ represents the best relative motion a submarine 
can achieve when closing with speed s/v = .8. Hypothetical values of 
expected hits relative to E are plotted against the distance x abaft 
c 
the ideal entry area, the leading row of the convoy. In this illus-
tration, E = 2 for an optimal entry, and h lines represent distances 
c p 
from the convoy from which the submarine may be expected to attain p 
hits by firing into the convoy from line h • 
P 
In this example, if attacking submarines are equally likely to 
approach in the region aft of the screen's right extremity and forward 
of LLA , the threat in expected hits per submarine there is about 1/3 
o 
that of submarines approaching in the screened region. If, in addition, 
it may be assumed that only 10% of submarines intercepting the convoy 
are likely to approach in the region aft of the screen, then the threat 
in the unprotected region is only .03 of the total threat from con-
ventional submarines. 
Factors (a) and (b) tend to cause the preponderence of conventional 
submarines to approach the convoy well forward of the LLA. Factor (c) 
o 
reduces the threat from submarines approaching from near the LLA • 
o 
The following two factors, however, will tend to decrease the density 
of submarines ahead of the convoy and disperse them toward either beam, 
and the last factor may also have this effect. 
d. Inability of submarine to close on exact relative track desired. 
Erroneous closing courses and speeds will disperse submarines 
on either side of their intended tracks. However, the dispersal of 
submarines gaining initial detection within 300 of convoy track will be 
small since the submarine commanding officer has ample time to correct 
o 
any initial errors. Beyond 30 , the number of submarines that by mistake 
drift out to higher relative bearings should be roughly compensated for 
by submarines at higher bearings making similar mistakes, the percentage 
of errors being greater at the greater bearings, where the relative 
motion problem is more acute and the margin for error smaller. 
e. Effect of convoy zig-zag. 




submarines to the right and left by an amount equal to the deviation of 
the zig-zag plan from the track made good. The amount of deviation should 
not be large in proportion to the three to five mile front of a large 
convoy. 
Thus, neither factor (d) or (e) would appear to add much to the 
proportion of submarines approaching from U/2 > 600 • 
f. Effect of escort station assignments. 
A third and more serious influence that will tend to disturb 
the natural concentration of submarines in the van may be the presence 
of powerful sonar on or near the convoy track. An AN/sQS-23 sonar 
positioned 10 or 15 miles in the van is a persuasive argument to the 
submariner to choose one side or the other for his approach. If the 
escort commander has reason to believe that such is the case, he must 
of course strengthen the flanks. (See Section G of this chapter.) 
Summary 
1. If conventional submarines are forced to make a submerged approach 
and if v ~s, then the submarines able to intercept the convoy will tend 
to be concentrated within U/2 = ± 600 • The fraction of submarines 
approaching from abaft of U/2 = ± 600 is nearly constant over a wide 




Conventional submarines approaching from abaft of U/2 = ± 60 are 
o less of a threat than those approaching from forward of 60 , by a factor 
of 1/4 to 1/2, in terms of expected hits. 
3. The escort commander must appreicate that a slight conventional 
submarine threat exists beyond the 600 radii. The two factors which 
probably influence the amount of this threat the most are known to him, 
namely: 
(a) The vigor with which fixed wing aircraft search just forward 
of the snorkeling LLA. 
(b) The disposition of his own long range sonars. 




4. The use of U/2 = ± 600 to define sector 1, the region of conventional 
submarine threat, is appropriate. 
2. The Distribution of Nuclear Submarines Around the Convoy 
The probability S(8) that nuclear submarines will detect the convoy 
at a given bearing 8 relative to the convoy base course depends on the 
patrol speed of the submarine relative to the speed of advance of the 
convoy. The solution for S(8) is given on page 8 of OEG Report 56 ~4J. 
For ratios of patrol speed to convoy speed of .5 and 1, the distribution 
of detecting submarines by bearing is as shown in Figure 25. 
Thus, for a .5 ratio (e.g., submarine search speed of 5 knots and 
convoy speed of 10 knots) the proportion' of submarines detecting the 











It is instructive to observe that like conventional submarines, the 
preponderence of nuclear submarines which detect and classify the convoy 
will approach the convoy from ahead. However, this observation is not 
very helpful in deploying escorts. We can inconvenience and delay the 
nuclear submarine by concentrating escorts in the van and forcing him 
to penetrate from the rear. But essentially the nuclear submarine has 
the ability to probe for a screen weakness and exploit it, if the weak-
ness can be found. How obvious the weakness must be is a question we 
do not examine further, but it is an important question to be answered. 
Clearly if given a choice, the nuclear submarine would most prefer 
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to close from ahead. Arguments have been advanced both that a beam 
approach and a stern approach would be the next preference. We will 
only say that, as between the two choices, the submarine commanding 
officer will attack where he thinks the screen is weakest. However, 
against a rectangular convoy, an approach from either quarter is suf-
ficiently undesirable that these regions may be given somewhat less 
attention, since: 
(1) The submarine has a difficult relative motion problem. 
(2) The submarine must make almost as much speed to attain the 
same closing rate as it does from astern. (Closing from 120
0 
relative, 
about 85% as much.) 
(3) The submarine cannot take advantage of the convoy wake. The 
net effect is that the escort commander must assume equal likelihood 
for all bearings outside of sector 1, and distribute his search appro-
priately, except perhaps, for some lessening of effort on the quarters. 
The nuclear submarine must get into the convoy to fully exploit 
its technological advantages. In the convoy is the most secure place 
to carry out its attacks. Any time the escorts can compel it to fire 
from outside the screen, even though it secures hits, (1) the nuclear 
submarine's effectiveness has been reduced and (2) it is much more 
liable to counteraction. Therefore, aft of the LLA for conventional 
submarines, escorts should generally accept the threat of hits from 
firings outside the screen to reduce the more serious danger of the 
submarine getting into the convoy unless the screening force is very 
large. In other words, when a solid screen cannot be presented, the 
escorts should patrol as close to the convoy as possible, within limita-
tions imposed by the time required to attack an approaching submarine, 
once detected, and the aforementioned wake interference. 
C. Determining Escort Detection Ranges for Computational Purposes 
In the conceptual solution, Chapter III, employment of the most 
correct representation of escort operational detection capability was 
envisioned. In Model I of Chapter IV, the overall detection probabilities 
P1 and P2 in sector




they were to be computed was not considered. In Model II of Chapter IV, 
the computational model, a definite range law was taken as a sufficiently 
accurate approximation of the escorts' true detection capabilities for 
the purposes of the calculations. Furthermore, computations were based 
on the premise that the degradation resulting from overlapping of the 
true detection capabilities would have an inconsequential effect on the 
results. Further discussion of the significance of this assumption is 
deferred to Section D of this Chapter. It is also assumed that the 
average sonar search effectiveness C( of an escort stationed in sector 2 
relative to its effectiveness in sector 1 is known. A brief discussion 
of this topic may be found in Section E, as well as in sub-section 2 
below. 
Proper characterization of operational sonar performance is 
naturally the subject of much study. The accuracy of the results of our 
analysis naturally depends on the accuracy of the model of escort de-
tection; the same may be said of any model using sonar performance. 
Although it is not our purpose to study the problem here, two remarks 
are in order concerning a practical procedure for determining the proper 
values of detection ranges to be used for computational purposes. 
1. Choosing Between Best Depth Range and Periscope Depth Range 
The two sonar ranges that are generally known to an operational 
commander are the best depth range (BDR) and the periscope depth range 
(PDR) for each escort. The difference between them is so great that a 
choice between the two would make a fundamental difference in the results. 
A not unreasonable procedure would be to offer no guidance but to leave 
entirely to the discretion of the escort commander the choice of either, 
or a range in between, based on his knowledge of the tactical situation. 
An alternative would be to offer the escort commander a simple 
ru1e~of-thumb, such as the following reasonable but arbitrary procedure: 
If the escort commander believes that at least half of all submarines 
approaching the convoy will come to periscope depth within PDR of an 
escort, he is to use 1/2 (PDR + BDR) as his sonar range. Otherwise he 
is to use BDR. 




alternative, a simple linear combination of ranges could be easily 
determined. Reflection on the problem will reveal however that a number 
of factors serve to complicate theprob1em to the point that, in view of 
the lack of precise information, the effort would not be worthwhile. 
To be cons ide red would be: 
(1) The proportion of nuclear submarines. 
(2) The relative threat of each class of submarines. 
(3) The probability that each class would come to periscope depth 
within range of an escort in each sector. 
(4) The assignment of escorts with various BDR and PDR between 
the two sectors. 
(5) The fact that the mean ranges calculated for each sector would 
be different. 
We believe that the most effective procedure is the simple use of 
escorts' BDR for all computations with the model. Unqualified use of 
BDR is, of course, pessimistic. This pessimism is offset by two overly 
optimistic factors concerning escort performance that exist in Model II. 
The first is the assumption that submarines are unable to split bearings 
or take advantage of gaps in the screen. The second is that the model 
does not provide for the aforementioned degradation of performance 
resulting when detection capabilities overlap. We regard the consistent 
use of escorts' best depth ranges for all calculations to be the optimum 
procedure. 
2. Effect of Escort Patrolling Station of Detection Capability 
For convoy speeds up to twelve knots or so~ that is, where escorts 
have a sufficient speed margin, the escorts can increase their effective-
ness by patrolling stations. A mathematical model for determining the 
amount of improvement is described in detail in Appendix A of OEG Study 
575, "Force Requirements for Anti-submarine Sonar Screens to Protect 
Convoys·· ~41. In particular (neglecting other factors discussed in 
Section E) an escort which patrols its station will, with the same 
probability of detecting submarines attempting penetration, screen a 
larger area at the rear of the convoy than in the van. 
CONFIBE~1t' IA!; 
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In our model,~represents the patrolling effectiveness factor of 
escorts assigned to sector 2 with respect to escorts assigned to sector 
1. That is, if 0<1 is the patrolling effectiveness factor in sector 1 
and~ 2 is the patrolling effectiveness factor in sector 2, then 
Clo<"'~~ I 
In the model, for simplicity of presentation, we have chosen 
0< 1 = 1. Hence,c::::>( = 0(2. Ife>< 1 is greater than one, as it normally 
is for escorts patrolling in the van, the effect is equivalent to an 
increase of Y, the total (summed) sweep width of the available defensive 
force. For example, a force of Y = 25,000 yards with c:>( 1 = 1. 2 is the 
equivalent when patrolling station of a force for which Y = 30,000 with 
C>( 1 = 1.0 (i.e., maintaining fixed station). 
In the model,~= 2.0 is the representative value we have chosen 
to use. Since we have also chosen ~l = 1.0, letting~ = 1.0 
corresponds closely with a fixed station, non-patrolling screen. 
D. The Model of Escort Detection Capability -- A Discussion of Lateral 
Range Curves and Their Approximations 
1. The Lateral Range Curve, the Definite Range Law, and Sweep Width 
When a sonar and its submarine target are on straight, reciprocal 
courses at constant speeds for a long time before and after CPA, the 
probability of detection p(x) is a function of the lateral range x. 
The graph of p (x) is called a Lateral Range Curve. In Figure 26, the 
escort is at the origin and the curve p(x) is the probability of de-
tecting a submarine passing at any range x from the escort . 
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A sonar's lateral range curve varies with every change of parameter~ 
more drastically than a radarvs lateral range curve, and much more 
drastically than the lateral range curve for visual search. Submarine 
type~ speed, depth, and aspect, sonar performance, and water conditions 
all combine to make p(x) fluctuate drastically. 
A simple form of Lateral Range Curve that is frequently assumed in 
analyzing sonar performance is known as the "Definite Range Law". Because 
it is popular and mathematically simple~ and because of 'its similarity to 
the widely known Sweep Width concept, we adopted the Definite Range Law 
in Model II. The Definite Range Law assumes that if a submarine passes 
within a certain range R characteristic of the sonar, detection always 
occurs. If the submarine passes outside that range, detection never occurs. 






The Definite Range Law is identical mathematically with the Sweep 
Width approximation of any Lateral Range Curve p(x). As ATP-l(A) Vol 1 [7J 
states on page 8-4, the Sweep Width expresses the measure of detection 
capability in which the maximum detection range of a sweep is reduced so 
that the number of targets detected beyond the sweep width W is equal to 
the number of targets inside W that are missed. Mathematically, 
c;:, 
W = SP(X)dX is the area under the lateral range 
curve~ and 
-0:> 
W = 2R is the equivalent expression for sweep 
w width, so 








In Figure 28, R is such that the shaded area under the Lateral 
w 
Range Curve p(x) and beyond R from x (representing extra targets 
w 0 
detected) is equal to the shadea area above the curve p(x) and within 
a distance R of x (representing short-range targets missed). For 
w 0 
any given W, the range R of the Definite Range Law equals R , the w 
effective sweep width, and the two concepts are mathematically equivalent. 
The similarity between the two conceptsis more apparent than the 
distinction. Conceptually, the Definite Range Law purports to represent 
the actual sonar detection "curve". The Sweep Width is only supposed 
to be a simple but useful measure of effectiveness of a true lateral 
range detection curve, p(x). Both have been referred to as approxi-
mations of lateral range curves. 
The Sweep Width (or Definite Range Law) approximation of sonar 
detection capability was used in our computations with reluctance. It 
was attractive mathematically of course, but the decisive factor in its 
favor was the desirability of using as many familiar and commonly 
accepted concepts as possible, without significantly compromising 
accuracy. The Definite Range Law was found repeatedly being used in 
a wide variety of analyses. We felt that we would be well within our 
goal of keeping the inaccuracies of the model less drastic than the 
inaccuracies of the input data. 
In retrospect, we are not sure that our concession to tradition 
was wise. In the first place, because of the nature of the problem 
(or at least because of the nature of our model of the problem) our 
solutions frequently involve putting escorts' detection zones adjacent 
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to each other. More precisely stated~ we occasionally had a solution 
with escorts stationed R, + R. yards apart (R, and R. being the half-
1. J 1. J 
sweep widths of the ith and jth escorts)~ resulting in a calculated 
probability of detecting 100% of submarines passing between them. The 
result was a slightly less accurate "optimal" division of forces. 
In the second place, we believe we may have foresaken a good opport-
unity to join in a coming battle to modify the Definite Range Law into a 
more valuable form. The remainder of this section is devoted to 
presenting an argument for more widespread use of the simple, more 
conservative, and more accurate Modified Definite Range Law. 
2. How Adding Sweep Widths Introduces Error into Overall Detection 
Probabilities 
The Sweep Width concept (or alternatively, the Definite Range Law 
used as an approximation) is a simple, one-number way of describing the 
effectiveness of a ,sonar. It has proven to be convenient for computation 
and accurate enough for most situations. As long as sonar search paths 
are far enough apart that regions of positive detection probability do 
not overlap, accurate results are obtained. 
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The heavy bell-shaped curves are the lateral range curves PI (x) and P2(x) 




on either side of the escort at xl' and out to a distance 
r
2 
on either side of the escort at xl' The shaded rectangles represent 
the equivalent Definite Range Laws. If the two escorts are screening an 
area of width L, as shown, the overall probability of detecting a sub-
marine attempting to penetrate the screen on the reciprocal of their 
track (assuming the escorts are not patrolling station and the submarines 
are equally likely to pass at any point in the interval from 0 to L) is: 
L ,--L 
P = llL ~ Pl(x)dx + llL ~ P2(x)dx, or equivalently, the sum 
~6 of the two ~weep widths divided by the width of 
interval being screened: 
p = ~Rl + 2RJ llL 
as long as the distance between escorts is at least r l 





. ~ (\ 
', .. " \.) 
However, if the bell-shaped detection curves p(x) overlap, i.e., 




' then the overall probability of detection is no longer 
simply the sum of the detection probabilities but somewhat less, because 
the horizontally cross-hatched area in Figure 30 is being searched twice 
by the escorts, and probabilities in this region are not additive. 
If one continues to evaluate the overall detection probability P 
using the Definite Range Law approximation, he is likely to add Sweep 
Widths after the lateral range curves have started to overlap. That 
is precisely the error we introduce in some of our Model II calculations 
e aUF IBEN'f IAL-
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when we assume a Definite Range Law. A rule of thumb has been that in 
calculating the overall probability P of detecting a submarine attempting 
penetration of a screen such as a bent line screen, no significant error 
will result from adding sweep widths until the probability of detection 
exceeds .7. In Model II, the optimal solution occasionally exceeds that 
figure in one sector or the other. We have not analyzed the amount of 
error we thereby introduce but we believe it is small compared to the 
accuracy of such estimates as @, the fraction of submarines attacking 
that are nuclear. 
3. Why the Error Involved in Using Sweep Widths is More Serious Than 
In the Past 
A number of new factors have caused an increase in the likelihood 
that serious error will be introduced by summing Sweep Widths in order 
to determine overall screen detection probabilities. 
(1) Patrolling is, or ought to be, employed in most escorting 
situations. Patrolling station results in more frequent overlap of 
lateral range detection curves, and hence, more error. 
(2) Evidence is accumulating that the operational lateral range 
curves are lower than was often assumed in the past, more like Figure 
32 than Figure 31. 
p(X) p(XJ 
\. 0 
The equivalent Sweep Width, W = 2R , becomes more hazardous to use as 
w 
the maximum height of p(x) becomes lower. If Figure 32 represents the 
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true lateral range curve~ the distance r - R that the true curve projects 
beyond the Sweep Width approximation is much greater than in Figure 31. 
Although the data we have seen are skimpYi we believe the curve showing 
operational detection curves with a maximum probability in the neighbor-
hood of .6 - .8 will appeal more to the intuition of officers with 
extensive ASW experience than a curve with a maximum in the neighborhood 
of .8 - .9. See pages 7pp of reference \}7] and Appendix A of reference 
[31 for recent evidence supporting the lower figures. 
(3) The AN/SQS-26 sonar has a detection pattern in deep water under 
certain sound conditions that cannot be approximated in even the crudest 
way by a Sweep Width. 
(4) The modern tactical situation is such that frequent overlapping 
of in-layer detection ranges (Periscope Depth Ranges) may occur. Modern 
sonars have much longer in-layer detection ranges than below-layer 
ranges (Best Depth Ranges), compared with World War II sonars. When 
screen spacing is guided by below layer ranges as one would always prefer, 
appreciable overlapping of in-layer detection regions will result. 
These four factors combine to make a powerful argument to abandon 
the Sweep Width system of calculating sonar performance, other than as a 
rough figure of merit. This is true even when one distinguishes separate 
Sweep Width figures for PDR and BDR. 
4. Certain Weaknesses in the Lateral Range Curves 
From an operational point of view, the best study with which the 
authors are familiar of broadly applicable sonar detection characteristics 
is OEG Study 69, Characteristics of Sonar Performance as Indicated by 
Analysis of 1951 OPDEVFOR Trial Data, [111. Although published in 1953, 
it is as pertinent today as when written. The study was prepared by 
B. O. Koopman, a leading analyst in the field of search theory. 
One conclusion of the study was that under a set of ascertainab1y 
similar conditions there is a range R outside of which detection is 
unlikely and within which it is fairly certain. Contact solidity (i.e., 
the tendency for contact once gained to be held) will be high within R 




dispersion -~ dispersion attributable to small variation in conditions 
or data taking and not to the nature of the detection. liThe practical 
issue is whether there is a set of observable conditions which, when 
kept fixed, leads to an approximate definite range law of detection." 
Koopman concluded that once the conditions are sufficiently constant, 
'1( 
a Definite Range Law of detection is obeyed with good approximation. 
His conditional conclusion has been used, unfortunately, all too often 
as a justification for the erroneous assumption that the Definite Range 
Law could be used for calculating probabilities in operational situations 
in a changing environment. This was not what Koopman intended to imply. 
In the first place, for the Definite Range Law to apply, a necessary 
condition is a continuously alerted sonar operator. In the second place, 
using the Definite Range Law as the most accurate model of a sonar's 
performance in an opera~Oh&environment assumes that the variables can 
continually be measued and accounted for in the formulation of the 
detection range R; but the fact is that R fluctuates in and out as 
water conditions, operator alertness, and even target aspect change! 
Koopman's investigation of the validity of the Definite Range law was 
for other purposes, two of which are discussed below. 
He then undertook the problem(of how to handle the effect of variable 
conditions, and hence variable range, in practice: "The second method 
for dealing with range variability is statistical. It assumes that on 
each approach the definite range law is valid but that the detection 
range is chosen at random from a set of values distributed statistically 
according to some ascertainable law." Instead of attempting to discover 
all the underlying conditions and how they affect R, one tries to measure 
their total effect and the modification which they induce on the lateral 
range probability p(x). The result is the familiar lateral range curve, 
p(x) -- experimentally determined and far more apt to fit the situation 
encountered in naval operations, with all the variability of conditions 
that are encountered. 
* But he added that for a given sonar and target, traveling at given 
speeds, the four easily observable conditions -- submarine depth, sonar 
message, sea state, and target aspect -- did not, when held constant, 
ensure a Definite Range Law. 
G~IFIBE!f'fIAD 
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Koopman points out two important implications~ 
(a) The Lateral Range Curve. p(x), is the product of its environment. 
There is no one p(x) applicable to a given sonar. The lateral 
range curve p(x) is also a product of its geographic environment. If 
it is derived from data taken off Key West, it is, strictly speaking, 
only applicab Ie in waters off Key West, or waters which have similar 
acoustic characteristics to those off Key West. If the lateral range 
curve is derived near Norfolk, or in the Mediterranean, or the South 
Pacific, the same reservations holds. 
While conducting ASW operations, our practical solution is to try 
to eliminate the water-condition variable by bathythermograph reading and 
by correcting our estimated range accordingly. But we should not 
visualize that eliminating this one variable transforms the bell-shaped 
p(x) into anything approaching a rectangu1ar=shaped definite range law. 
In calculating overall screen detection probabilities, such as the 
probability that a submarine will penetrate, say, a SC6 bent line screen, 
analysts are fairly smug about the results if they use the sonars' 
published lateral range curves in calculating the detection probabilities 
of the screen. We do regard these values as high because they are taken 
under experimental conditions with alerted operators, and we do attempt 
to compensate for this. But we seldom consider, or even mention, the 
fact that even the most precise Lateral Range Curve is applicable only 
for a particular water environment. 
The practical significance of the geographic variability of p(x) 
is this: a close approximation to a p(x) such as the Modified Definite 
Range Law probably loses very little in accuracy from its mathematically 
much more difficult parent, the Lateral Range Curve. 
(b) Adjacent ship detection probabilities are statistically non-
independent 
If the overall screen effectiveness is being calculated using 
appropriate lateral range curves p.(x), usually the assumption is made 
~ 
that the individual detection probabilities are statisticaHy independent. 
Suppose that several escorts are in line abreast facing a submarine 




any two, separated a distance S (see Figure 33) consider a submarine 
pex) 
1.0 






passing at distance x from escort Nr. 1 and a distance S - x from 
o 0 
escort Nr. 2. Let P(x ) be the probability that the submarine is 
o 
detected by either ship. 
regard (1 - P1(x
o
» (1 -
to make detection. Then 
submarine is: 
The usual method of evaluating P(x ) is to 
o 
P2(x » as the probability that both ships fail 
o ) 
the probability that one or both detect the 
But this expression assumes that the detections by the escorts are 
independent events. 
As Koopman points out on page 58, "Since a greater definite range 
R means a greater chance of detection on the part of each surface craft 
(supposed to be operating sufficiently close together under sufficiently 
homogeneous sound conditions so that they are both subjected to approxi-
mately the same R), the events of their detection are dependent and in 
fact positively correlated. Consequently the assumptions underlying 
the screen formula are false." In summary, if water conditions are such 
that one escort misses the submarine, the probability is greater than 
the formula indicates that the other escort will also miss the submarine. 
Averaging over a wide variety of sonar conditions such as would be 
CGNFI);}:8N'f'IAi! ' 
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experienced in an ocean transit, the number of detections is less by a 
significant amount than would be calculated assuming statistical independ-
ence. As an example, suppose that water conditions are such that two 
escorts stationed adjacently in the screen have detection ranges of 
3000 yards for half the transit and 2000 yards for half the transit. 
Consider the probability of detecting a submarine penetrating exactly 
half way between the escorts stationed at a distance of 5000 yards apart. 
Using a single lateral range curve for the whole transit, the probability 
of detection would be calculated as .75. Computing the probabilities of 
detection for each half of the transit separately, the overall prob-
ability of detection is only .5. And the latter calculation assumes 
that as many submarines will attack when water conditions are unfavorable 
to them as will attack when water conditions are favorable. 
The foregoing amounts to another argument favoring the use of a 
Lateral Range Curve that is truncated at the extreme detection range R 
for use in calculating screen effectiveness, i.e., a Modified Definite 
Range Law. 
One final caution regarding OEG Report 69 must be added. The 
investigation was conducted as a statistical analysis of experimental 
data obtained with AN/SQS-4 sonar at detection ranges on the order of 
3,000 yards. The physics of the situation was treated as incidental. 
Anyone familiar with the complex factors involved in an analysis based 
on acoustic principles will appreciate the advantage of the statistical 
approach. At the same time he will understand why Koopman was forced to 
conclude that all important variables had not been included among the 
four that were held constant. What is remarkable is that at relatively 
short ranges, the physical variables such as surface reflection, rever-
beration, transmission loss, and roll and pitch of the escort may be 
disregarded to the extent that, for all practical purposes, a definite 
range law applies. 
Only in the most idealistic sense, however, could detection at 
ranges longer than 3,000 to 5,000 yards be said to obey a definite range 
law. Beyond some such range, signal distortion and scattering, the 
interference of multiple surface and bottom reflections, and other 
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effects of the physical environment, have so powerful and variable an 
influence on sonar signal attenuation, that any attempt to identify and 
fix them, even for experimental purposes, would probably fail. In any 
case, bottom bounce and convergence properties of acoustic signals compel 
the abandonment of the Definite Range Law for characterizing either 
experimental or operational detection properties of long range sonars 
such as the AN/SQS-26. 
E. The Modified Definite Range Law 
The Modified Definite Range Law was conceived as a measure of 
* operational effectiveness of any sensor. The Modified Definite Range 
Law assumes that everywhere within a range R, targets are detected with 
probability p (rather than probability one) and outside of R, no targets 
are detected. See Figure 34. 
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The Sweep Width for the Modified Definite Range Law is therefore: 
W = 2pR (instead of 2R as for the Definite Range Law). 
The Modified Definite Range Law has two advantages over the true 
lateral range curve: 
1. It is far easier to use mathematically. 
2. It is easier to obtain data on which to determine it. See [31 
for the procedure for calculating from operational exercises. 
The disadvantage is some loss of accuracy, but Section D points out two 
reasons why the loss is less than might otherwise be supposed. 
* It came to the attention of the authors through the thesis of a 
previous Operations Analysis student, LT. W. E. Clark, USN [2J 
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The Modified Definite Range Law has two advantages over the Definite 
Range Law. 
1. The Modified Definite Range Law more closely approximates the 
sensor's actual performance, a particularly important factor when the 
maximum probability of detection is considerably less than one. 
2. The Modified Definite Range Law serves as an alert to an erroneous 
estimate of detection performance resulting when two or more sensors 
search on parallel tracks with overlapping lateral range curves. 
The disadvantages of the Modified Definite Range Law compared with 
the Definite Range Law are: 
1. It is slightly more difficult to grasp conceptually. 
2. It is slightly more difficult to manipulate mathematically. 
The advantage of the Modified Definite Range Law over the Definite 
Range Law may be seen graphically if one compares the form of a recent 
lateral range curve determined experimentally against nuclear submarine 
targets with, first the Definite Range Law, and second, the Modified 
Definite Range Law. See Figures 35 and 36 on the following pages. The 
experimental data is taken from [i7l . 
One final advantage of the Modified Definite Range Law over the 
Definite Range Law as an approximation of the true Lateral Range Dis-
tribution might be mentioned. The height p or the width R may be changed 
if there is some good reason for doing so. The only criterion is that p, 
or equivalently R, is chosen to most usefully approximate the true lateral 
range curve. For example, looking at Figure 36, p = .8 might have been 
chosen giving, R = 2120 yards; or R = 3400 yards might have been chosen, 
giving p = .5. Normally the choice would be the one which would minimize 
the amount of shaded area, but there might be reasons for doing other-
wise. From this point of view, the Definite Range Law is merely an 
extreme case of the Modified Definite Range Law. 
F. Effect of Submarine Bearing of Approach on Detection Probability 
A number of interrelated factors make the relative probabilities 





bearings of approach and different approach speeds, very difficult to 
estimate analytically and impossible to measure with any precision. 
Specifically these factors are: 
1. Relative speed of approach: 
(a) Patrolling escorts can screen greater areas in submarine-
space with the same probability of detection (See Appendix A of ~~). 
(b) Submarines with slower relative speeds (closing rates) 
will be within the detection zone of an escort longer, whether the escort 
patrols or not. 
2. True speed of approach: 
(a) A submarine may be significantly noisier when approaching 
from astern, in which case it will be more liable to passive detection. 
(b) At high speeds , the submarine will be able to gain less 
listening information for splitting bearings, etc. 
3. A submarine has less control over the aspect it will present 
when approaching from abeam or astern. 
4. Wake effect degrades hull-mounted sonar performance astern of 
a convoy. 
Wartime data will not give the answer: in wartime we will seldom 
know how (from what direction primarily) a submarine that gets into the 
convoy evaded the screen. We will only know how submarines did not 
penetrate successfully. 
Yet the relative probabilities of detection will be fairly easy to 
learn experimentally. We need not worry, at least as a first approximation~ 
about the difference between experimental and operational performance 
and other factors which are important in determining actual operational 
lateral range curves. By making the reasonable assumption that opera-
tional performance is degraded proportionately for all approach bearings, 
knowing the detection probabilities relative to each other will satisfy 
the need. These may be determined by experiment in which the emphasis 
is on uniformity of all conditions (water, submarine depth, sonar per~ 
formance, etc.) except bearing of approach, Since these relative 
probabilities have such an important effect on the proper disposition of 
escorts it is important to obtain data as soon as possible. 
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G. The Best Range at Which to Station Escorts 
Introduction 
In developing the analytical model (Chapter IV, Model II) we assumed 
that regions of equal torpedo threat to the convoy were circularly dis-
tributed and concentric with the center of the convoy. We assumed that 
the threat varied linearly with range from the center of the convoy, 
having a maximum value at the perimeter of a circle, HO' established as 
the minimum feasible at which to station the escorts, to a value of zero 
at the maximum range of the enemy torpedo. A scaling factor was intro-
duced to allow for varying the estimate of the difference between the 
number of hits, h ,a submarine would be expected to achieve by 
max 
firing at H and the number of hits it would be expected to achieve once 
o 
it penetrated the screen. 
One procedure that may be used for establishing the escort perimeter 
has been to station screening ships and helicopters near the limit of 
the torpedo danger zone (abbreviated TDZ. See Figure 2-6, [8J ). A 
mo~e realistic procedure, even with a powerful screening force, would 
be to station the escorts where the probability of a hit is small, say 
.2. This procedure has the advantage of simplicity, but allows no 
provision for screens so weakened by deploying them at the required range 
that submarines would have a considerable opportunity to split bearings 
and penetrate between escorts. 
Bent line screens are based on the concept of stationing escorts 
, 
at the range from the convoy at which the probability of a submarine 
sinking or severely damaging a single major target by firing at that 
range equals the probability that the submarine can penetrate the existing 
screen successfully ~8 J. The most important weakness in this approach 
for establishing convoy screens stems from the fact that in a convoy 
there is not one but a multiplicity of targets. Submarines firing from 
long range and submarines electing to penetrate may be able to attain 
hits on several merchant ships. 
Balancing the threat 
A first approximation of the proper distance from the convoy to 




in expected number of hits by a submarine firing at a given range before 
it is neutralized by the screen, with the expected number of hits by a 
submarine which attempts to penetrate the screen. We used this concept 
to develop the much simplified method we used in Model II. 
An example of balancing the threat at a particular bearing for a 
particular class of submarines will illustrate the principles involved. 
Fixing attention at one bearing, the threat from outside is 
T' = N' . H'(r) 
where N' is the number of torpedoes the submarine may be expected to 
fire before neutralization and H'(r) is the probability of a hit from 
range r. 
The threat from a penetrating submarine is 
T = N . H . (1 - P) where 
N is the number of torpedoes the submarine may be expected to fire once 
it penetrates the screen, before it breaks off its attack or is neutra1= 
ized. 
H is the probability of a hit from in or near the convoy, 
P is the probability that the submarine is detected during penetration. 
Equating the threats: 
N • H . (1 - P) = N' HI (r) 
or N HI (r) = ·H . (1 - P) 
N' 
If N = 5, Nt 2, H - .8, and P = .5 
H'(r) = (5/2) (.8) (1 - .5) = 1.0 hits. 
Thus, the solution is that escorts should be stationed at the range 
which prevents the submarine from attaining one hit by firing at the 
convoy from outside the screen. However, in this example, the screen 
detection probability at the bearing was assumed to be constant. 
Typically P is also a function of r, and another method, such as that 




The probability of an unaimed straight running torpedo achieving a 
hit in a convoy has been investigated in references U-2J and ~3J for 
various convoy sizes, speeds, and ship spacing, and various torpedo 
ranges. Against the traditional broad front convoy formation, contour 
lines of equal hit probability ("iso-probability contours") are roughly 
as depicted in Figure 37. 
h=:- o. 
The iso-probability contours are characterized by: 
a. A dip in the van attributable to the narrower target aspect. 
b. A bulge on the bows attributable to the broad target aspect 
and short torpedo run. 
c. A gradually decreasing distance from the convoy beam aft to the 
quarter attributable to successively longer torpedo runs. 
d. A dip astern attributable to the narrow target aspect and maximum 
torpedo run. 
The authors did not investigate whether similar data was available for 
acoustic homing torpedoes. 
The single most important factor in varying the distance from the 
convoy and shape of the: iso-probability contours was the convoy spacing. 
The authors compare the difference between the calculated contours 




We assumed that the probabilities of hits for multiple shots h 
max 
were independent, so that the total expected number of hits would be 
merely the product of the single shot probability and the number of 
torpedoes fired. As would be expected, the model contour lines were, 
by comparison, too far from the convoy in the van, too short on either 
bow, approximately correct on the flanks, and too far astern in the rear. 
Our assumption of a linear decrease in hit probabilities with range 
seemed to be as accurate as any other. Variations in ship spacing may be 
accounted for by proper variation of h . For reasons we will now 
max 
undertake to explain, we believe that any attempt to attain more detail 
in the analytical model would serve no purpose. 
The incompleteness of the "balanced threat" concept 
If two assumptions held, the correct action would be the procedure 
; 
we have just presented: to station escorts around a perimeter which 
balances the threat of the submarine firing outside or inside the 
screen (the "equi-threat contour line" previously defined) thereby 
nullifying the submarine's advantage of choice. The first assumption 
is that a submarine can and will fire right up to the line of screening 
ships. Longer ranges of detection and stand-off weapons make this 
assudption increasingly poor. In addition, when we are able to take 
advantage of a submarine's inability to determine which form of attack-
ing the defenses are optimizing against, we should do so, 
The second assumption concerns the probability that the submarine 
will be sunk during an attack. In effect we have assumed above that the 
same number of submarines will be sunk regardless of how they attack; or 
alternatively, we have assumed that the importance of the submarine's 
surviving is small compared to the importance of its carrying out its 
mission to sink merchant ships. 
An example of how the second assumption fails is as follows~ 
Assume that doctrine in the escort forces is to balance the inside/ 
outside threats to shipping (i.e., letting T = T'). For values of N, 
Nt, P, and H used in the above example, the solution was to place escorts 




the screen h(r) = 1.0. In this examp1e,the probability that a penetrating 
submarine is detected is P = .5. After attack and during its escape, 
the submarine again runs the risk of detection. Let us say for purposes 
of illustration that the probability of detection is P = .3. Suppose e 
that, for the bearing we are considering, the probability that a sub~ 
marine which fires from outside the screen is detected is pO = .4. 
Let us further suppose that any time a submarine is detected, the escorts 
have a probability of sinking it before it escapes of D = .6 • 
For a submarine penetrating, the rate of sinking per attack is 
P • D + P • D • (1 - P) = (.5 X .6) + (.3 X .6 x.5) = .39 e 
For a submarine firing from outside the screen, the rate of sinking 
per attack is p' • D = .4 X .6 = .24 
The submarine can attain the same number of expected hits in either 
case, because the screen was deployed to that end. Therefore if the 
submarine commanding officer recognizes the situation, he would always 
choose to fire from outside the screen. 
Suppose now that the escort commander decides to take the risk to 
the submarine into consideration, and extends the screen until the value 
of lost merchantmen is weighed agains"t the value of sunk submarines. 
Another element enters the problem: submarine attrition other than in 
attacks on convoys may influence the submarine decision. Sinkings due 
to Hunter-Killer Groups, VS patrols around the convoy, barrier opera~ 
tions, or any other source, may be high compared to attrition by the 
screen against penetrating submarines. The correct action by the sub= 
marine would then be to attempt screen penetration (especially if the 
number of convoys the submarine may expect to intercept during a patrol 
is small) in order to achieve the greatest number of sinkings per convoy. 
We conclude, therefore, that determining the best distance .from 
the convoy on the basis of equating T = T' is satisfactory only as a 
first approximation, and that both tactical and strategic considerations 
must govern the escort commanders' exact disposition. Simple and direct 
information as to which choice submarines actually make will be the most 
important wartime basis for adjusting the screen out or in from the 
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T = T' line. Therefore we believe that any attempt at greater detail 
in Model II would be fruitless. 
Considerations affecting escort deployment at various relative 
bearings 
We conclude this section by offering opinions as to the probable 
courses of action by submarines attacking from various relative bearings 
around the convoy. 
a. Conventional Submarines: A conventional submarine in advance 
of the convoy front has little choice but to be over-run by the screen 
and will prefer to penetrate the screen safely before attacking. On the 
other hand, a conventional submarine attacking from either baw aft to 
the extreme limiting lines of approach has a superior position for 
obtaining hits in the convoy by firing at long range, but it is on a 
less favorable bearing for penetration, because of the relative motion 
problem. There will be a preference to fire from outside the screen in 
this region. 
b. Nuclear submarines: The above considerations apply, but to a 
lesser extent, to nuclear submarines. A noisy, high speed approach 
tactic would be advantageous only in the van. The nuclear submarine has 
its longest, slowest approach from abaft of 1350 relative to the convoy 
track, but it is able to take advantage of wake effect directly astern 
of the convoy. (See Section B of this chapter for further information 0 ) 
The two most important factors in determining the range for defending 
against a nuclear submarine are the comparative damage it will achieve 
by attacking from inside or outside the screen, and the ability of the 
escorts, including aircraft present, to counterattack in each case. 
Therefore nuclear submarines should have a strong preference for screen 
penetration. 
We reemphasize the importance that convoy spacing has on the optimum 
distance from the convoy to station the escorts. The wider the spacing 
of merchant ships within the convoy, the smaller the probability of a 
hit from a "Browning shot" fired outside the screen, and at the same 
time, the longer will be the perimeter around the convoy. Unless the 
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screening force is very strong, it will almost always be advantageous 
to place the escorts at minimum distance (distance at which they can 
effective ly neutralize penetrating submarines) if merchant ship spacing 
is 2000 yards x 2000 yards or greater. 
H. Single Perimeter vs. Defense in Depth 
1. Basic Reasons for Perimeter Defense 
Implicit in our approach to the convoy defense problem has oeen the 
assumption that a single perimeter at an optimal range is superior to 
a defense in depth. The justification has been: 
a. The fact that the farther from the convoy an escort is 
stationed, the smaller the angle it can defend. For a circular defense: 
doubling the distance from the center of the convoy halves the angle 
screened. 
b. The assumption that the submarine cannot detect weak points in 
the screen. (Although the reader may recall that we have investigated 
the consequences if a nuclear submarine is able to detect gross weak-
nesses and exploit them. See Chapter IV.) 
2. Basic Reasons for Defense in Depth 
A major a~gument advanced in favor of a defense in depth has been to 
provide insurance that the assumption (para. b above) holds. Stationing 
escorts with powerful in-layer (PDR) detection capabilities at longer 
ranges in the van is intended to deprive the submarine of the opportunity 
to come to periscope depth to detect screen weaknesses. Better yet, 
there is the strong belief current that submarines will come to periscope 
depth in spite of the presence of the sonar, in which case the escort 
would have a good detection opportunity against it. 
A defense in depth is also envisioned as depriving the submarine 
of tactical intelligence about the overall strength of the screen, the 
primary information it desires to base a decision whether or not to 
attempt screen penetration. 




or radar intelligence of not only the screen, but of the course, speed, 
and composition of the convoy as well. Placing pickets at ranges from 
.. the convoy beyond the normal screen in the region at which the submarine 
must come to periscope depth to observe the convoy magnifies its problem 
and its risk. 
Stationing pickets or pouncers (i.e., providing for a second line 
of defense) in the van also affords additional protection against the 
danger of a high speed penetration by a nuclear submarine. The high 
relative speeds involved in such attacks from ahead of the convoy make 
it difficult, to put it conservatively, for an escort to detect, claSSify, 
and react effectively to neutralize such a target. An alerted back up 
ship will be in a better position to take successful action. 
Finally, a long range sonar stationed directly ahead of the convoy 
may induce the submarine to avoid it by sheering to one side, thereby 
missing the convoy or at least reducing the danger of a successful 
attack. 
3. Disadvantages of a Defense in Depth 
However, there are serious disadvantages to a defense in depth. 
The fundamental weakness is that the farther an escort is from the convoy 
the smaller the arc it defends. To put an escort with a powerful sonar 
in a picket station is to remove the most effective detector from the 
area where it will be most useful. Furthermore it will in all likelihood 
remove the best weapon carrier from the most probable scene of action. 
On the other hand, putting an escort with a short range sonar in a 
picket station is of little value for inhibiting the submarine from 
coming to periscope depth at. long range. 
Placing one screening 'ship behind another as a second line of 
defense reduces the effectiveness of the second. For example, suppose 
two escorts patrol zones in tandem with respect to the direction of an 
approaching submarine, and each escort has a .7 probability of detecting 
a submarine passing through its zone. The second escort will have an 
opportunity to gain initial detection on only the .3 of the submarines 




of the detection probabilities, then the second escort would detect 
only .7 of the remaining submarines, (i.e., .7 X .3 = .21 of submarines 
coming through the sector). If there is an unguarded gap in the screen, 
the escort would probably be more effective in the gap. 
Two modifying remarks are pertinent: 
a. The performance of the second escort is not independent of the 
presence of the first. A submarine which has been preoccupied with 
evading the first escort ought to be somewhat more vulnerable to detection 
by the second. 
b. If each escort is patrolling a wide sector, on the order of 
perhaps three or four times its effective sweep width, the probability 
of it detec;ting a penetrating submarine (in the van) would be only about 
.3. The second escort would then still play an important role: credit-
ing it with the same sonar, a smaller arc to patrol, and the advantage of 
a less wary submarine, its probability of detection might be as high as 
.5. 
However, the effectiveness of the "pouncer" is dependent on its not 
being directly behind the first screening ship as much of the time as 
possible. Rather than assigning escorts to patrol areas as depicted 
in Figure 38 it would be wiser to station them as in Figure 39, if the 
need for defense in depth is imperative. 
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Regarding the need to deprive a conventional submarine of tactical 
intelligence, the need is probably less important than some may have 
believed. We have argued (see Section B of this chapter) that a con-
ventional submarine is largely committed to the relative bearing of 
its attack by the time it is close enough to obtain tactical information 
about the screen disposition. Although a nuclear submarine has much 
greater flexibility in selecting its bearing of attack, it will not 
probe for weaknesses indefinitely. It is doubtful that, under the 
stress of the situation, it will be able to determine any but the 
grossest weaknesses in a screen, whether the screen is deployed in a 
single perimeter or a defense in depth. 
Placing a long-range sonar directly in advance of the convoy has 
another disadvantage. The less aggressive submarine commanding officer 
who is most likely to stand clear of the sonar is probably the same one 
who would like to fire from outside the screen on either bow. By 
avoiding the sonar he will place himself, barring a fortuitous zig-zag, 
in just the position he desires to achieve. 
The argument favoring a second line of defense in the van to react 
to nuclear submarines penetrating at high relative speed is a persuasive 
one. One comment might be made. Escorts located in pouncer station to 
combat this threat will not be very effective if they are equipped with 
short range sonar and weapons. 
4. Conclusion 
There is no simple answer to the question of whether a perimeter 
defense or a defense in depth is better. An estimate of the probable 
aggressiveness or lack of it on the part of the enemy is the most 
important single consideration. Fleet experience with exercise sub-
marines in peacetime obviously cannot be a guide in this respect. 
Peacetime intelligence when known, and wartime intelligence when avail-
able as to enemy submarine aggressiveness will be the single most 
important consideration. 
The next most important factor is the strength of the screen. If 
water conditions are such that operational sweep widths (including 
correction for patrolling) total greater than .6 of the length of the 
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optimum defense perimeter, overlapping detection regions will result 
anyway, and a partial defense in depth without loss of sonar search 
effectiveness is feasible. If total sweep width is less than .6, 
careful consideration must be given to the danger of creating large 
gaps in the screen by any form of defense in depth. 
The third most important factor is what the enemy believes is the 
strength of the screen. If the escort commander can persuade the enemy 
that he faces a tighter screen than usual, the enemy will be more in-
clined to attack at long range. If he may be induced to believe he 
faces a tight screen in the van, he will be inclined to fire from off 
the bows. On the other hand, if he believes he faces a thin screen or a 
screen deployed at too great a distance from the convoy~ he will 
naturally be tempted to attempt screen penetration. Facing a staggered 
screen, as shown in Figure 39 above, the enemy may observe only the 
outer ring of escorts and choose to split bearing and pass between a 
pair of them, only to find himself facing a strong pounceI' on the inner 
ring that he is unable to evade. 
The recommended ranges at which to station escorts in Appendix I 
are based on a perimeter defense. However~ some of the advantages of 
staggering escorts accrue from deploying escorts on the bows at longer 
ranges from the convoy. 
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A. Computer War Gaming 
Computer war gaming would be of great benefit either in verifying 
the conclusions of the thesis or in studying other convoy defense problems. 
It is likely belaboring the obv~ous to say parts of the analysis need 
substantiation. Fleet exercises can shed very little light on such 
matters as the probability distribution of submarines approaching a 
convoy in wartime. Nor does our experience in World War II, such as the 
preference of U-Boats to attack convoys from the beams, seem to be very 
helpful. The conc~p~ developed in Chapter III should be adaptable to 
the study of a wide variety of convoy defense problems by computer war 
gaming. 
Sections of the thesis which we would particularly suggest for 
study: 
1. The analytical model, Chapter IV-B 
2. The difference between submarines on patrol in an area and 
those that can intercept a convoy, Chapter V-A. 
3. The distribution of submarines around a convoy~ Chapter V~B. 
4. Defense in depth vs. a perimeter defense, Chapter V~G. 
Other convoy problems suggested for study~ 
1. Proper disposition of escorts when the primary mission of the 
submarines is to sink escorts. 
2. Convoy defense in the face of coordinated simultaneous attacks 
by two or more submarines. 
3. Convoy defense in a nuclear war and/or in the face of submarine 
launched missile attacks. 
B. The Aircraft Platform 
Throughout most of the analysis the presence of fixed wing aircraft 
and helicopters has been assumed. No investigation was made of the 




most likely source o The advantages and disadvantages of integrating a 
CVS with the convoy are well known 0 However one aspect of the problem 
has an important bearing on the analysis in the thesis. 
Ifa CVS is located in the convoy in a box at the rear~ the expected 
number of hits among merchant ships ,is no longer a valid measure of 
screening effectiveness, because the CVS is so much more important a 
target. The small fraction of conventional submarines approaching from 
bearings greater than 600 , or a handful of nuclear submarines able to 
approach from astern, present a disproportionately greater threat to the 
carrier. 
There are other important considerations in determining where to 
station the CVS, but this much is clear~ for situations in which the 
nuclear submarine threat is small, the screen is frequently most effective 
if all or nearly all of it is stationed in the van. Stationing the CVS 
inside the convoy screen entails an effective screen all around the 
convoy. Added to the convoy screen will be the escorts that were with 
the CVS, but these additional escorts will probably not be sufficient 
to provide the all-around protection now needed. The protection in the 
van may be so reduced as to result in much easier screen penetration from 
ahead, and an overall increase in the submarine threat to the convoy. 
C. Helicopters in Convoy Defense 
In the thesis we have had very little to say about the best way to 
employ helicopters as screening units, other than to reaffirm the special 
advantages helicopters have for searching astern of the convoy. We have 
simply assumed that the effective sweep width of the helicopters could 
be characterized and that their unique capabilities and limitations would 
be provided for by the escort commander. One method for determining 
helicopter sonar search effectiveness may be found in kl4J. 
D. Long Range Sonars 
If it develops that the AN/SQS-26 sonar has a dignificant detection 
capability by bottom bounce or in the convergence zone, annuli of positive 
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detection probability will exist at 35 miles or more from the escorts 
equipped with that sonar. No matter how high the detection probability 
is in those regions, however, unless an effective kill capability ac-
companies the detection capability~ such detection cannot be regarded as 
equivalent to the type of detection hitherto considered. It would be more 
appropriate to treat these long range detections and the corresponding Kill
 
probabilities as part of the approach attrition. That is~ a long range 
detection would not be treated as a screen detection, but rather would 
be taken into consideration in determining s3(Q)~ the probability that 
a submarine would attack from bearing 9 (see Chapter III). 
Remaining to be considered is the optimum station for an escort 
with an AN/SQS-26 type sonar. In the conceptual framework of Chapter III, 
op timization would have to be taken over not only the screen perimeter 
" but over the region of approach as well. The importance of solving this 
problem will depend on how effective the long range capability of the 
AN/SQS-26 sonar proves to be and on the effectiveness of the weapon that 
is mated with it. 
E. Advantageous Escort Stations for Counterattack 
An escort stationed ahead of the convoy is able to move much more 
rapidly relative to the convoy than one stationed astern, and therefore 
is better positioned to counterattack inside the screen. This is a 
factor that we have ignored in our model, because the solutions always 
call for a greater concentration of escorts in the van. 
In heavy weather, it is advantageous for submarines to retreat into 
the wind after attack. Escorts may move downwind much more efficiently 
when high seas are running. Therefore, all else being equal, the escort 
- commander should favor a slightly heavier concentration of escorts to 
windward in severe weather. 
F. Convoy Shape 
Much of the analysis herein has assumed a square convoy shape only 




the smallest perimeter. 
The broad-front World War II convoy was justified because submarines 
preferred to attack from the bows and beams of theconvoy~ and shortening 
the fore-and-aft dimension reduced the convoy target length. 
It is not obvious that a broad front convoy is justified today, 
particularly against an aggressive enemy. Submarines penetrating the 
screen from ahead will have an easier task against a broader front. 
Submarines approaching in the convoy wake astern will also benefit from 
a broad front. 
We believe Model II may be used without significant error with 
convoys of length~breadth dimension ratios up to 1~2. 
G. The SSNK as a Convoy Escort 
The authors are not entirely familiar with the limitations of a 
nuclear submarine for ASW. However it is apparent that the factors 
prohibiting its use in the defense of a carrier are much less important 
for convoy defense, namely, high carrier speed and poor surface-to-
submarine communications. 
It is envisioned that an SSNK would be stationed directly under 
the convoy. Escorts would be prohibited from pursuing an enemy submarine 
into the convoy and the responsibility would devolve on the SSNK to 
counter the threat. The premise is that surface escorts will have an 
extremely difficult problem in detecting and attacking any submarine, 
especially a nuclear submarine, once it gets under the closely spaced 
merchant ships. There would be no communication between SSNK and surface 
ships except, perhaps, for an alerting explosive signal. 
The SSNK would cruise with its sonar in passive. Although the 
listening would be degraded by its speed and convoy noise, we conjecture 
that it would retain the capability of detecting high speed approaches 
from astern of the convoy. The minimum requirement is that the SSNK 
have an appreciable capability of detecting and sinking the enemy sub-
marine after it has attacked the convoy. 
• CONF IBE!H' IA!& ' 
100 
; . -. ~ .: 
-. 
GONFIBBN'i'IL\.oJt 
The slower the SOA of the convoy~ the greater the value of the 
SSNK. On the lOne hand~ enemy nuclear sub~rines would be more likely to 
approach from astern. On the other hand~ the SSNK passive sonar would 
be more effective. 
It is envisioned that all surface escorts would be stationed ahead 
of the convoy, with responsibility of detecting submarines waiting 
quietly to be over·run by the convoy. The SSNK would be responsible 
for the defense on the beams and aft. 
The SSNK would be uniquely effective countering the threat of 
multiple~submarine attacks. The enemy would no longer know whether 
another submarine was friend or foe; the SSNK would knQw that any other 
submarine was an enemy. 
The basic principle justifying the assignment of an SSNK is that 
it must be employed where the greatest number of enemy submarines may 
be expected. If a real threat to convoys exists at all, then convoys 
will be focal points of enemy submarine action. 
The knowledge that an SSNK might be operating with a convoy~ even 
with low probability, would force upon the enemy a considerable measure 
of additional caution. It might even be profitable to 'Ureveal'u our 
intention of using SSNK's with convoys, whether we actually do so or not. 
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The .tab1es in this appendix are for a convoy described by the 
following parameter values: 
1. H = 10000 yards. 
o 
2. A - 1/3. 
3. RT = 15000 yards. 
Force level ranges from.2S000 to 45000 yards of sweep width. For 
each force level there is a table with e = .5 and e = 1.0. In all 
cases, ~ is taken to be 2. and k is taken to be 2.5 • 
The left side of the table gives the values of T, R1 ' and R2 
corresponding to the minimum RISK solution. The right side shows the 
allowable spread of T in order to keep RISK within .05 of its minimum 
value. If T is chosen within the limits specified, interpolate to find 
the corresponding Rl and R2• Variations of R1 or R2 of less than 1000 
yards are insignificant. 
The method discussed in Chapter IV=C may be used to establish 




Y 25000 yards; R1 and RZ x 1000 yards 
r" . 
e = .5 
minimum RISK solution allowable range for min R!SK + .05 
@ T R1 RZ RISK T R1 R2 
.0 100 14.9 .ZO 78-100 12.4"'14.9 10 00 
.1 100 14.8 .36 56~100 10.0-14.8 10.0 
.2 62 10.1 10.0 .44 55 .. 89 10.0~13.4 10.0 
.3 63 10.1 10.0 .52 53=75 1000=11.6 10.0 
.4 64 10.0 10.0 .60 48-72 10.0=11.0 10.0 
.5 65 10.0 10.0' .69 26-71 10.000 10.1 10.0 
.6 27 10.0 10.0 .74 21-66 10.0 10.1
00 10.0 
.7 27 10.0 10.0 .75 21-42 10.0 10.1 .. 10.0 
.8 26 10.0 10.0 .76 21 .. 35 10,0 10.1=10.0 
.9 26 10.0 10.0 .76 21~33 10.0 10.1
00 10.0 
1.00 26 10.0 10.0 .77 20-31 10.0 10.1-10.0 
e = 1.0 
minimum RISK solution allowable range for min RISK + .05 
@ T Rl R2 RISK T Rl R2 
.0 100 17.3 .31 86-100 16 00-17.3 10.0 
.1 100 17.1 .46 70-100 1402-17.1 10.0 
.2 63 13.1 10.0 .60 35-100 10.0 .. 16.9 10.2-10.0 
.3 42 10.1 10.0 .63 35-67 10 00-13.2 10.2-10.0 
.4 44 10.0 10.0 .66 34-56 10 00-11.6 10.3=10.0 
.. 
.5 47 10.0 10.0 .71 33-55 1000~11.1 10.4-10.0 
.6 37 10.0 10.0 .75 31"54 10.0-10.5 10.7-10.0 
.7 37 10.0 10.0 .78 30-51 10.0 10.9-10.0 
.8 : 36 10.0 10.0 .81 30=45 10.0 10.9-10.0 
.9 36 10.0 10.0 .84 29-43 10.0 10.9-10.0 




Y = 30000 yards; R1 and R2 x 1000 yards 
e = .5 
minimum RISK solution allowable range for min RISK + .05 
@ T R1 R2 RISK T R1 R2 
.0 100 17.0 .16 80-100 14.5-17 .0 10.0 
.1 90 15.7 10.0 .32 47-100 10.0-16.9 10.0 
.2 51 10.0 10.0 .36 46-73 10.0"'13.2 10.0 
.3 52 10.0 10.0 .40 45 .. 62 10.011.5 10.0 
.4 53 10.0 10.0 . .44 40 .. 60 10.0 .. 11.0 10.0 
.5 54 10.0 10.0 .49 36-59 10.0 d 10.1 10.4=10.0 
.6 39 10.0 10.0 .52 35 .. 58 10.0 .. 10.3 10.5"'lO.0 
.7 39 10.0 10.0 .54 34-51 10.0 10.7-10.0 
.8 39 10.0 10.0 .55 34 .. 46 10.0 10.7 .. 10.0 
.9 : 39 10.0 10.0 .56 34-44 10.0 10.7-10.0 
1.0 39 10.0 10.0 .58 33-43 10.0 10.8-10.0 
e = 1.0 
minimum RISK solution allowable range for min RISK + .05 
@ T R1 R2 RISK T R1 R2 
.0 100 18.9 ---- .24 88-100 17.8-18.9 10.0 
.1 100 18.8 .40 69-100 15.5-18.8 10.0 
.2 52 13.0 10.0 .52 37-100 10.8-18.6 10.5-10.0 
.3 47 12.0 10.0 .54 35 .. 64 10.1=14.3 11.8-10.0 
.4 47 11.6 10.0 .55 36 .. 56 10~0"12.9 11.7-10.0 
.5 47 11.2 10.0 .57 37-53 10.0"12.1 11.5-10.0 
.6 47 10.8 10.0 .58 38-51 10.0"11.4 11.4~10.0 
.7 46 10.2 10.1 .59 40-50 10.0 .. 10.9 11.0-10.0 
.8 47 10.0 10.0 .60 42"'50 10.0-10.4 10~'9.-10.0 
.9 47 10.0 10.0 .64 41 a 51 10.0 10.9-10.0 





Y. = 35000 yards; R1 and R2 x 1000 yards 
e = .5 
minimum RISK solution allowable range for min RISK + .05 
@ T R1 R2 RISK T R1 R2 
.0 100 19.0 .12 82-100 16.5-19.0 10.0 
.1 77 15.6 10.0 .28 42-100 10.0-18.9 10.9-10.0 
.2 47 10.6 10.1 .29 42-66 10.0-13.8 10.9-10.0 
.3 47 10.4 10.1 .29 42-56 10.0-12.0 10.9-10.0 
.4 47 10.2 10.1 .30 43~53 10.0-11.3 10.8-10.0 
.5 47 10.0 10.1 .30 44-51 10.0-10.8 10.6-10.0 
.6 48 10.0 10.0 .31 44 .. 51 10.0a10.6 10.6-10.0 
.7 48 10.0 10.0 .33 44~51 10.0-10.4 10.6 .. 10.0 
.8 47 10.0 10.1 .35 44-51 10.0-10.1 10.6-10.0 
.9 47 10.0 10.1 .36 43-51 10.0 .. 10.1 10.8-10.0 
1.0 47 10.0 10.1 .38 43-51 10.0 10.8-10.0 
e = 1.0 
minimum RISK solution allowable range for min RISK + .05 
@ T RISK T 
.0 100 20.4 .18 87-100 19.3-20.4 10.0 
.1 100 20.3 .34 68-100 16.6-20.3 10.0 
.2 55 14.6 10.0 .44 44-95 12.9-19.6 10.0-11.9 
.3 55 14.3 10.0 .47 41-68 12.1-16.2 10.0-12.4 
.4 54 13.9 10.1 .49 38-62 11. 2 .. 15.1 10.0-12.9 
.5 54 13.5 10.1 .50 34-59 10.1-14.3 10.0 ... 13.5 
.6 54 13.2 10.0 .52 34-58 10.0-13.8 10.0-13.5 
.7 54 12.8 10.1 .54 35-57 10.0-13.3 13.4-10.0 
.8 41 10.1 12.4 .55 36-56 10.0-12.7 13.2-10.0 
.9 43 10.1 12.0 .55 38-56 10.0-12.3 12.9-10.0 




Y = 40000 yards; R1 and R2 x 1000 yards 
e = ,5 
minimum RISK solution allowable range for min RISK + ,05 
@ T R1 R2 RISK T R1 R2 
.0 100 20.8 .08 83-100 18,3-20,8 10,0 
.1 67 15,6 10,0 ,24 40"'100 10.5=20,8 12.7=10,0 
.2 54 13.1 10,0 ,25 38-69 10,0-15,8 13,1=10,0 
,3 54 12.9 10,0 ,25 39-61 10,0=14,2 12,9-10,0 
.4 54 12.8 10.0 .26 39-59 10,0-13,7 12,9-10.0 
.5 54 12.6 10.0 .27 39-57 10,0=13,2 12,9-10,0 
.6 53 12,2 10,2 ,27 40-56 10,0-12,8 12,7=10.0 
.7 53 12.0 10.2 .28 40=56 10.0"'12,6 12,7-10,0 
.8 44 10.0 11.9 .28 41=55 10.0"12.2 12.3=10.0 
.9 45 10.0 11.7 .28 42=55 10.0=12.0 12.3=10,0 
1.0 46 10.0 11.6 .28 43-55 10.0=11.7 12,1=10,0 
e = 1.0 
minimum RISK solution allowable range for min RISK + .05 
@ T R1 R2 RISK T R1 R2 
.0 100 21.9 .13 89-100 20.6-21.9 10,0 
.1 100 21.8 .29 66-100 17.6=21.8 10.0 
.2 60 16.5 10.0 .37 49-89 14.8-20.4 12.2=10.0 
.3 60 16.2 10.0 .40 47-70 14.1=17.7 12.6=10.0 
.4 60 16.0 10.0 .42 43=66 13,1"'17,1 13.4=10,0 
.5 60 15.7 10.0 .45 38=64 11.8=16,3 14.3=10.0 
.6 60 15.4 10.0 .47 31=63 10.0=15.9 15.5=10.0 
.7 55 14.2 11.1 .49 31-62 10,0=15,4 15.5=10.0 
.8 39 10.7 14.1 .50 32=61 10.0=14.9 15.4=10.0 
.9 38 10.1 14.3 .50 34=60 10 0 0=14.2 15.0=10.0 




Y = 45000 yards; R1 and R2 x 1000 yards 
e = .5 
minimum RISK solution allowable range for min RISK + .05 
.. 
@' T R1 R2 RISK T R1 RZ 
.0 100 22.6 .05 85-100 20.2-22.6 10.0 
.1 60 15.7 10.0 .20 45"'100 12.6~22.5 13.1"'10.0 
.2 59 15.3 10.0 .21 43-71 12.0"'17.6 l3.5-10.0 
.3 59 15.2 10.0 .22 39-65 11.0"16.3 14.3=10.0 
.4 59 15.0 10.0 .23 36=63 10.1-15.8 15.0=10.0 
.5 59 14.9 10.0 .24 36-62 10.0=15.5 15.0=10.0 
.6 59 14.7 10.0 .24 36=61 10.0=15.1 15.0=10.0 
.7 59 14.5 10.0 .25 36=60 10.0-14.9 15.0"'10.0 
.8 40 10.2 14.1 .25 36=60 10.0=14.5 15.0=10.0 
.9 40 10.0 14.1 .25 37-60 10.0-14.3 14.7=10.0 
1.0 41 10.0 l3.9 .25 38=59 10.0=13.9 14.5=10.0 
e = 1.0 
minimum RISK solution allowable range for min RISK + .05 
@ T R1 R2 RISK T R1 R2 
.0 100 23.2 .07 90=100 22.0=23.2 10.0 
.1 100 23.1 ---- .24 64-100 18.4-23.1 10 • .0 
.2 65 18.3 10.0 .31 53-87 16.4"'21.4 12.6=10.0 
.3 64 18.0 10.1 .34 50-73 15.7-19.4 13.2=10.0 
.4 64 17 .8 10.1 .37 46=70 14.6-18.7 14.1=10.0 
.5 64 17 .6 10.1 .40 40=68 13.1=18.2 15.3=10.0 
.6 64 17.3 10.1 .42 30=67 10.5=17.8 17 .2"'10.0 
.7 54 15.2 12.4 .44 28-66 10.0 .. 17.4 17.7=10.0 
.8 38 11.5 15.7 .45 29-65 10.0:..16.9 17.4=10.0 
.9 34 10.1 16.4 .44 30=63 10.0=16.2 17.2"'10.4 




I APPENDIX B 
DIAGRAM OF A TYPICAL SCREEN PERIMETER 
Fig. 40 illustrates how ranges Rl and R2 may be modified to provide 
for the shape of the convoy, and submarine preference for attempting 
screen penetration or attacking from outside the screen. (See Chapter 
V-F .) 
In ZONE I (Ahead): All submarines will prefer to penetrate the 
screen. Station escorts at the minimum distance from the convoy at 
which the neutralization of a detected contact is still practical. With 
very strong screening forces, stagger escorts alternately on lines A and 
B. 
In ZONES II and III (Bows): Conventional submarines may prefer t9 
fire from outside unless the screen is deployed to discourage them. 
Station escorts with strong in-layer detection capabilities in these 
zones. With very strong screening forces, consider increasing the 
distance of the perimeter from the convoy. Without VS aircraft patrol 6 
ling the limiting lines of approach, extend the screen arc aft to + 80 
degrees relative. 
In ZONE IV (Flanks and rear): Nuclear submarines will prefer to 
penetrate the screen before attacking. Station escorts at the minimum 
distance from the convoy at which neutralization of a detected contact 
is still practical. Ships or helicopters with the ability to search 
beneath the convoy wakes should be stationed in the rear. Width of 
patrol sectors should be proportioned according to existing 
doctrine. 
The diagram was prepared for the following situation: 
H 
0 
= 10000 yards 
Y = 35000 yards. 
A = 1/3. 
k = 2.5. 




e = 1.0 
@ = .3 
= 2 
From the appropriate table in Appendix A we obtain the following: 
T = 55% or 19000 yards of sweep width (spread~ 41 to 
68%, or 14000 to 23500 yards of sweep width). 
R1 = 14300 yards (spread: 12100 to 16200) ~ 





COMPUTER PROGRAM AND SAMPLE OUTPUT 
The program below is written in FORTRAN 60 for use on the CDC 1604 
computer. The data input statements have been omitted. Data inputs 
necessary are A, H , RT, e, ~ , and Y. The symbols correspond to 
o 












The program as reproduced here prints out only those values cor-
responding to the minimum RISK solution (see sample output sheet following 
program). In order to examine the rate of change of RISK with respect 
to T in the neighborhood of the minimum RISK solution, it is necessary 
merely to insert an additional PRINT statement into the program so that 




OAT A CARDS HERE 
HL =RT + HO 
Al= 1. -AA 
:: 1.1 ( 2. *P I * A~ ) 
= ALpHA/(2.*PI*A1J 
PRINT 1000,AAty,~OtRTtALPHA~E 
FORMAT (6H1AA • Fl0.4,_X,_HY ~ Fl0.4.4X,SAHO = ~10.4.~x,· 
. , . 
1 SHRT = F10.4,4X.8HALPHA =Fl0.4,_~,4HE ~"Fl0.4/}· 
DO 100 J ::"1,7 







DO 100 1 =1,11 .-
A=(FLOATF(I~1»)/1tr~O 
= 
500 KK = 1, 101 
Xl =,Y*(1.-FLOAlFlKK-1'*.Ol)·. 
~lT = B3 + SQRTFIB3*B3 + 
IF (RlT) 10,.10,11 
11 IF (R 1 T - HO' 12. 13, 1 3 
12 R1T= HO 
13 P1T = BO*XT/R1T 
IF( 1.-Pll) 500.114.14 
14 R2T= G3 + SQRTF( G3*G3 + 
IF (R2T) 15,15,1~, 




17 R2T = HO 
18 P2T = GO*(Y-Xl) 1~2T 
IF ( 1 • -P·2l ) 500,19. 19 
- o. 
, = G3+SQ.RTFCG,3*G3+G4*Y) 
'IF (R2T-HO) 30~31 ,3'" 
RISKT = 
TTl = O. 
. \ 
'. XT ~ = O. 
GO '~O 150 
R2T':~= o. 
B3+SQRT F ( 63 * B3 
IF(R1T":HO) 
R1T = HO 
P1T = BO*V/R1T 
IF(1.-P1T) 500,21,21 
21 RISKT = O-Bl*V/R1T 
TT = 1.0 
',:; " 
XT = 1. 
GO TO 150 
., 
19 RISKT = 0 -( B l*XT IR 1T 




IF(RISK - RISKTl 
RISK = RISKT 
500,500,151 
Rl = R1T 
R2 = R2T 
T = TT 
500 CONTINUE 
160 PRINT 1002,A,T,Rl,R2,RISK 
~1002 FORMAT l5(8X,Fl0.4) 
100 CONTINUE 
· .•. 1 
BO .. 10.0000 
-, 
,1.0000 '17.0372 '.0000, '· .. ··.1593·. 
1.0000 " 16.9968 .0000 .2494 
.5000 10.0562 10.0000 .,.,,3158 
~5000 10.0000 10 .. 0000 
-.. ?"",,".' -
.3264'" 
.5100 10.0607 1O.QOOO .3384 
'.5100 10.0000 10.0000 .• 3512 
.5200 . 10.0217 10.0000 .. 3672 
.. 4500 -' 10.0000 10.0000 .3796 
, .4400 10.0000 10.0229 .3816 
""0""4400 10.0000 ' 10.0229 .3831' 
. . 





';.0000 :1.0000 17.0372 .0000 .1593 
~1000 1.0000 16.9575 
c... 
'.0000 .2835 
,,; .2000 .5100 10.1000 
'- 10;0000 .' .3378 
•... ~3000 ' .5100 10.0000 10.0000., .3618 
' .• 4000 •.• 5200 10.0000 10.0000 ""'~""''''J/ .. " .... 3878 
'.' .5000 .• 5300 10.0000 10.0009 .. -:4"l85·, ". C_'_ .... 
,'.6000 . .5200 - 10.0000 10.0000 '.4541 
.7000 .4100 10.0000 10.0000 .• 4610 
.8000 .4100 10.0000 10.0000 .·.~4679 
... 9000 .4100 10.0000 10.0000 ~4748 
'1.0000 ' ,~ .4100 10.0000 "10.0000 '.·4817 
UNCLASSIFIED 
APPENDIX D 
THE QUESTIONNAIRE SENT TO DESTROYER SQUADRON COMMANDERS 
Attached is a copy of the convoy screening problem which the auth~rs 
mailed to all Destroyer Squadron Commanders in October 1963. C~pies 
were also sent to 23 other commands for information. 
Solutions to the problem were returned by the following comm~nds~ 
Commander Destroyer Squadron TWO 
Commander Destroyer Squadron FOl~ (two solutions) 
Commander Destroyer Squadron TWELVE 
II II II FOURTEEN 
" " II EIGHTEEN 
II Ii Ii TWENTY =TWO 
II " II THIRTY-TWO 
Commander Escort Squadron TEN 
Commander Destroyer Squadron THREE 
" II "FIVE 
II II Ii SEVEN 













Commanding Officer and Director ~ U. So Atlantic Fleet ASW 
Tactical School 
Commander Cruiser Destroyer Flotilla SIX 
Commander Cruiser Destroyer Flotilla NINE 
Commanding Officer, U. S. Fleet Sonar School, Key West (two 
solutions) 
Copies of this thesis are being sent to commands requesting them 0 
The authors had originally intended to include a synopsis of the 
solutions. However, we concluded that most of our comments would be 
more misleading than helpful. Such wide differences of command experience 
in ASW and care in preparation were evident that any simple tabulation or 
summarization would not have been meaningfulo Furthermore, the reader, 
with justice, might have been suspicious that any statements we made 
were colored by our conception of the important elements of the pr~blemo 
We have given our views in the thesis~ there is little to be gained by 




One fact, which became apparent from the variety of the solutions 
and accompanying comments, was that there was no common method of 
~ttacking the problem of convoy defense against a mixed submarine threa.t. 
Indeed, a wide diversity of opinion was expressed regarding almost every. 
aspect of the problem. Perhaps no questionnaire was needed to persuade 
the reader that such would be the case. 
We have declined to explicitly "solve" our own problem. There is 
a gulf separating our analytical solution from the solution that places 
'/ 
specific ships with specific attributes at specific stations. We have 
been away from fleet operations too long to presume to bridge this gap. 
It is only the commander on the scene, intimately knowledgeable about 
antisubmarine warfare, who is qualified to deploy and fight his force. 




U. S. NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
Monterey, California 
21 October 1963 
Commander Destroyer Squadron ZERO 
Fleet Post Office 
New York, New York 
Dear Captain Smith: 
For a masterVs degree thesis in the Operations Analysis Curriculum at 
the U. S. Naval Postgraduate School I am undertaking a study of the following 
ASW problem: 
Conjecture a convoy of given dimensions transitting an area 
in which opposing submarines of various characteristics 
and/or weapons are stationed. The fractions of each type 
of submarine can be estimated. The convoy is defended by 
surface escorts that have a variety of sonars, other sensors, 
and ASW weapons. In addition, the convoy may be defended 
by VS and HS aircraft. The problem is to deploy the escorts 
for optimum defense of the convoy under the conditions given. 
I am writing you, as well as all other destroyer squadron commanders, 
soliciting your solution to a particular problem of this nature, the 
details of which are contained in enclosure (I). The solution consists 
of positioning each of eight escorts on the maneuvering board plot of the 
convoy vicinity, enclosure (2). Your answer will assist in evaluating 
my own analysis and solution of the general problem. 
The plot alone will be completely adequate. Supporting arguments for 
your decision are unnecessary, but are invited, as well as other comments 
you may consider helpful. Copies of squadron doctrine on the subject and 
reference to recent studies of the problem among the operating forces 
which might not otherwise be available would be welcome. 
I shall feel free to use your data in the thesis unless you specify 
to the contrary. However, no identification of source by name or title 
will be made unless you request credit. The classification of your reply 
willo£ course:'be a matter under your cognizance. 
The Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (Op=32) has interposed 
no objection to my conducting this inquiry. 
Your reply will be more helpful if mailed not later than 31 December 




Operations Research (Code 5510), U. S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 
Ca lifornia. 
wish. 
I shall be happy to send you a copy of the completed thesis if you 
Enclosure (1) Screening Problem Data 









Operations Evaluation Group 
Fleet Sonar School, KWEST 
ASW Tactical School, NORVA 
COMDESDEVGRU TWO, NWPT 
121 
Very respectfu11y~ 
Wayne p, Hughes, Jr, 
Lieutenant Commander, USN 
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SCREENING PROBLEM DATA 
1. Except for the number of escorts or ships in the convoy~ the parameters 
following may be changed if desired. Although a change of inputs will not 
detract from the usefulness of your solution~ bear in mind that the situa-
tion is deliberately artificial in order to introduce a variety of com-
plicating elements. . 
2. The inference should not be drawn that all data given will explicitly 
affect your solution. 
3. Assume the current state-of-the-art, except consider that all new 
sensors and weapons are in fully operational status. It is intended 
that operational, rath~r than theoretical or test performance, be 
considered. 
4. Consider a non-nuclear war. 
5. Escort data: 
Escort Number Sonar Weapons 
1 AN/sQS-26 ASROC, DASH, Mark 44 torpedo 
2 SQS-23 ASROC, DASH, Mark 44 torpedo 
3 SQS-23 DASH, Mark 44 t/o 
4 SQS .. 29 WEAPON ALFA, Mark 35 tlo 
5 VDS and SQS-30 Mark 44 t/o, Hedgehogs 
6 VDS and SQS-32 Mark 43 tlo, Hedgehogs 
7 SQS-4 Mark 32 t/o, Hedgehogs 
8 SQS-4 Ma,rk 32 t/o, Hedgehogs 
Radar, ecm equipment, speed, and endurance are compatible with 
above characteristics. Assume depth charges carried in any or all escorts 
if desired. Assume weapons expenditure does not enter into the problem, 
e'xcept in the case of the aircraft. 
6. Convoy data: 99 ships, 1000 x 1000 yard spacing. CVS in box in rear 
center (CVS=lO class). Dimensions: 16,000 yard front, 6,000 yard depth. 
Speed: 10 knots. 
7. Weather: Sea state two. Wind from ahead at 12 knots. Daylight 
o 
conditions. Water temperature: 77 from surface to 150 feet; thence 
linear gradient to 520 at 600 feet. 
8. Aircraft data: two S-2A (S2F-3) on station in ATP=LA Airplan 7. 






9 • Submarine intelligence: Totals unknown~ but estimated 80% conventiona.l 
. (USS TANG class characteristics) and 20% nuclear (USS SKATE class 
characteristics) • Submarines will be stationed at intervals of not less 
.. fhariSO miles, and normally attack independently. Their mission is convoy 
destruction. Weapon: 15,000 yard straiglt-running torpedoes. They will 
'probably counterattack upon assurance of detection and use passive acoustic 
"homingtorpedoes for defense. They may be expected to attempt .Zpenetration 
"in the dark" 50% of the time, and come to periscope depth at unknown 
distances before penetrating 50% of the time. Assume the limiting lines 
of.apprO,ach for the conventional submarines that are plotted on enclosure 
(2) • 
10. It will be assumed that appropriate evasive steering plans for the 
. convoy and the escorts are in effect, and other conventional defensive 
measures such as antiacoustic torpedo noisemakers are provided for. 
,Special or unusual tactical procedures may be noted if desired • 
", ", ." 
ENCLOSURE (1) 
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